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MARRIAGE EQUALITY, WORKPLACE INEQUALITY:  
THE NEXT GAY RIGHTS BATTLE 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter* 
Abstract 
Same-sex marriage is not the only civil rights issue impacting the gay 
community. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges represented a momentous victory on same-sex marriage, 
workplace protections affect far more people and remain a high priority 
for many lesbians and gay men. Today, even though the Supreme Court 
has invalidated state marriage restrictions across the country, federal law 
still makes it perfectly permissible to fire a gay man for telling a coworker 
about his sexuality or to discharge a woman for displaying her wife’s 
picture at work.  
This Article critically evaluates the relationship between same-sex 
marriage and workplace rights. Focused narrowly on case-by-case 
tactics, proponents of same-sex marriage won in court by selectively 
choosing gay couples who appeared “safe” and “ordinary” to judges. The 
decision to prioritize marriage over other gay civil rights—while utilizing 
reductive depictions of gay relationships in the process—raises distinct 
challenges for lawyers attempting to extend victories on the marriage 
front to other important legal realms such as employment protections. 
Outlining a model for thinking about gay rights beyond marriage, this 
Article calls for renewed attention to the argument that sexual orientation 
discrimination constitutes a form of sex discrimination. The cultural 
imperative requiring individuals to desire only partners of the opposite 
sex constitutes American society’s most enduring gender stereotype. 
Employers and states that punish sexual minorities for violating this norm 
engage in both sexual orientation discrimination and sex discrimination. 
By combating discrimination in employment, housing, and other civil 
rights areas, this refocused approach to gay rights applies to numerous 
legal contexts outside of marriage, thereby addressing the legal needs of 
a much larger segment of the gay community. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Has the moment for gay civil rights finally arrived? With the now-
familiar image of same-sex couples exchanging vows on city hall steps, 
it might appear that gay individuals finally stand on the precipice of 
enjoying full social equality in the United States. But the seductive urge 
to meld “marriage rights” with “gay rights” obscures other important 
goals that the gay community has not yet attained.1 For example, despite 
the Supreme Court’s historic ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges invalidating 
same-sex marriage bans throughout the country,2 federal law still does 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Amy L. Brandzel, Queering Citizenship? Same-Sex Marriage and the State, 11 GLQ 
171, 189 (2005); see also Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of 
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 90 (2014) 
[hereinafter NeJaime, Before Marriage] (discussing the centrality of marriage within 
contemporary debates over gay civil rights).  
 2. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 28 (U.S. June 26, 2015); see also United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83 (2013) (striking down a provision of the Defense of 
2
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not protect gay workers from employment discrimination.3 This curious 
state of affairs means that gay couples can legally marry in every 
jurisdiction, while employers in most states can legally fire gay 
employees based on their sexual orientation.4  
Despite the popular notion that marriage represents gay advocacy’s 
crowning achievement,5 employment protections constitute a far more 
important objective for many gay individuals.6 The workplace 
mistreatment that this group continues to endure underscores the 
importance of this issue. For example, one recent study on the topic noted 
that more than one third of sexual minorities said that they had 
experienced workplace harassment in the last five years, and twelve 
percent believed that their employer had fired them because of their 
sexual orientation.7 Compared to heterosexuals, openly gay job 
applicants are forty percent less likely to receive job interviews in certain 
sectors.8 Given that employment discrimination affects a much larger 
                                                                                                                     
Marriage Act that defined “marriage” as a legal union between “one man and one woman as 
husband and wife” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For an examination of court decisions 
striking down state marriage bans, see infra Subsection III.A.1 and accompanying discussion. 
 3. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that employment 
protections under Title VII do not extend to people “based on their sexual preferences”); see also 
Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 
715, 722 (2014) (noting consistency on the issue among federal courts). 
 4. Compare Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide Marriage Rights for Gay Couples 
Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/us/supreme-court-
to-decide-whether-gays-nationwide-can-marry.html?_r=0 (noting that the number of jurisdictions 
that have adopted same-sex marriage is rapidly expanding), with Soucek, supra note 3, at 722 
(“[F]ederal courts have almost universally refused to derive protection for sexual orientation from 
Title VII’s ‘sex’ prong.”). See, e.g., Caroline J. Lindberg, Comment, Lisa Grant v. South-West 
Trains: The Limited Utility of Sex Discrimination Arguments in Securing Lesbian and Gay Rights, 
12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 403, 421 (1998) (“For example, a lesbian living in Hawaii might 
well be entitled to legally marry her partner, but in the absence of protection for sexual orientation, 
she could be summarily fired when she sends her boss an invitation to her wedding and he 
discovers that she is a lesbian.”).  
 5. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1236–37 (2010) (discussing analogies between same-sex marriage and 
the civil rights movement).  
 6. See generally PEW RESEARCH CTR., A SURVEY OF LGBT AMERICANS: ATTITUDES, 
EXPERIENCES AND VALUES IN CHANGING TIMES 9 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/06/SDT_LGBT-Americans_06-2013. 
pdf (outlining policy priorities within the gay community). 
 7. Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination 
Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and 
Providing for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 721 (2012) (summarizing 
data on discrimination against gay workers). 
 8. András Tilcsik, Pride and Prejudice: Employment Discrimination Against Openly Gay 
Men in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOC. 586, 614 (2011) (examining sexual orientation 
discrimination in American labor markets). 
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share of the gay population, it is unsurprising that many gay individuals 
rank workplace protections above marriage rights.9 After all, not 
everyone wants a state-sanctioned marriage, but everyone wants to hold 
down a job.10  
This Article considers the relationship between same-sex marriage 
and workplace protections. Although proponents of gay marriage often 
contend that marriage rights will lead to other civil rights,11 this Article 
outlines the challenges of parlaying the success of Obergefell to other 
areas. Unfortunately, proponents of same-sex marriage—despite their 
success—have not devised an antidiscrimination framework that easily 
extends beyond the marriage context to other important civil rights such 
as employment and housing. In short, movement lawyers won in court by 
presenting a “just like you” image of homosexuality to judges that 
focused on gay couples’ long-term commitment, professional careers, 
and children.12 These “safe,” undifferentiated images intentionally 
downplayed issues of sexuality, gender, and diversity within the gay 
community while placing the importance of marriage above other 
interests.13  
Although this strategy yielded remarkable success on the marriage 
front, it presents serious challenges in the employment context. To 
explain why, this Article contrasts the image of the non-threatening gay 
couple presented in marriage cases with various gay figures that appear 
in employment discrimination decisions. Since the Supreme Court 
recognized same-sex harassment as a form of sex discrimination over 
fifteen years ago,14 two exceptions have emerged to the general rule that 
an employee’s sexual orientation is irrelevant to liability under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).15 This Article identifies a 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See Brandzel, supra note 1, at 189 (noting commentary that “only a few stand to benefit” 
from same-sex marriage). 
 10. See Josh A. Goodman, Marriage Equality as a Catalyst for Full LGBT Equality?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-a-goodman/ 
marriage-equality-as-a-catalyst-for-full-lgbt-equality_b_2946588.html (discussing priorities 
within the gay-rights movement). 
 11. See Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV. 257, 272 
(2013) (examining the categorization of marriage as a central civil rights issue for gay 
individuals). 
 12. See Libby Adler, The Gay Agenda, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 170 (2009) (analyzing 
the “normalizing rhetoric” utilized by same-sex marriage advocates). 
 13. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 236, 239–40 (2006) [hereinafter Franke, Politics] (critiquing the cabined 
presentation of gay identity within the same-sex marriage movement). 
 14. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (enumerating the protected classes of “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin”); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(discussing the irrelevance of sexual orientation to Title VII). 
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“predatory gay” exception to Title VII that rejects the relevance of a 
straight harasser’s sexual orientation but focuses intently on a gay 
harasser’s sexual orientation.16 Conversely, this Article outlines an 
“effeminate victim” exception that prevents gay men from winning Title 
VII harassment claims unless they can prove separately that they are 
exceptionally effeminate.17 A less common but still present “masculine 
victim” exception exists for lesbians as well.18  
Put together, these exceptions paint a picture of gay workers that 
starkly contrasts with the representations of gay plaintiffs in same-sex 
marriage decisions such as Obergefell. Sexualized and aggressive on one 
hand, while soft-spoken and weak on the other, the gay figures of Title 
VII tap into age-old tropes that associate homosexuality with danger, 
predation, and deviancy.19 Indeed, the menacing gay figures of 
employment law might appear unrecognizable or, even worse, 
frightening to the happy, ordinary couples of same-sex marriage. 
The benign imagery of the same-sex marriage campaign has enabled 
courts to emphasize the primacy of marriage without delving into more 
complicated issues of gender, sex, and sexuality.20 But without a vision 
of equality that connects sexual orientation discrimination to larger 
systems of gender construction, the expansion of gay civil rights may end 
at marriage.21 This Article seeks to avoid such a result by drawing 
renewed attention to the sex discrimination attack on sexual orientation 
discrimination.22  
                                                                                                                     
 16. See, e.g., Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2012) (basing 
liability on evidence that an accused same-sex harasser had “sexual interest in males” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 162 (2012); see also Jessica A. Clarke, 
Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 583–84 (2013) (discussing heteronormative presumptions in 
Title VII).  
 17. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming 
gay victim’s harassment claim); Soucek, supra note 3, at 732–37 (discussing the importance of 
perceived effeminacy in Title VII case law). 
 18. See infra Section II.B and accompanying discussion of lesbian plaintiffs in Title VII 
cases. 
 19. See Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and 
Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1335–36 (2011) (outlining common cultural assumptions 
associated with gay identity). 
 20. See Adler, supra note 12, at 170 (discussing the discursive strategies used by advocates 
of same-sex marriage).  
 21. See id. (examining the obfuscating effects of formal equality). 
 22. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is 
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 197–98 (1994) [hereinafter Koppelman, Sex 
Discrimination]; Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. 
REV. 187, 231. See generally Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: 
Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American 
Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1995) (distinguishing between the concepts of gender and 
sex). 
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According to the sex discrimination argument, when states (and 
private employers) discriminate against gay individuals, they do so not 
only because of their sexual orientation but also because of their sex.23 
For example, discriminating against a woman because she chooses a 
female partner is simply a form of sex discrimination because the state or 
her employer would not have taken the adverse action against her had she 
been a man with a female partner. In other words, but for the plaintiff’s 
sex, the state would not have engaged in discriminatory acts and her 
employer would have refrained from harassing her.  
Even though courts have not yet widely embraced this theory, judges 
in recent gay-rights decisions have begun to connect sexual orientation 
discrimination to sex discrimination.24 Likewise, the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—the agency that 
enforces Title VII—has recently taken the rather dramatic step of 
prosecuting sex discrimination claims on behalf of gay workers even 
though Title VII does not explicitly prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination.25 Although scholars have separately considered the sex 
discrimination argument in the contexts of marriage26 and employment,27 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 34 
RUTGERS L.J. 107, 108–09 (2002); Koppelman, Sex Discrimination, supra note 22, at 199, 203 
(discussing the stigmatization of sexual minorities in American society); Deborah A. Widiss et 
al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 461, 462, 464 (2007) (examining the contours of the sex discrimination argument).  
 24. See, e.g., Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105–06 (D.D.C. 2014) (affirming a 
gay plaintiff’s hostile work environment theory under Title VII); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 
2d 1181, 1206–07 (D. Utah 2013) (finding that a state amendment’s ban on same-sex marriage 
discriminates on the basis of sex), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014). 
 25. Processing Complaints of Discrimination by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
(LGBT) Federal Employees, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/directives/lgbt_complaint_processing.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 
2015) (“Lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals may also experience sex discrimination, including 
sexual harassment or other kinds of sex discrimination.” (citation omitted)); Michel Martin, Equal 
Employment Agency No Longer Turning Away Gay Discrimination Claims, NPR (Apr. 2, 2014, 
11:47 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/02/298328951/equal-employment-agency-no-longer-
turning-away-gay-discrimination-claims (summarizing the agency’s policy change). 
 26. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 103 (2005); Mary Anne Case, What 
Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1199–2000 
(2010) [hereinafter Case, Have to Lose]; Clark, supra note 23, at 108–09; William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equality, 74 IND. L.J. 1085 (1999); Koppelman, Sex 
Discrimination, supra note 22, at 197–98; Widiss et al., supra note 23, at 461–62. For critics of 
this approach, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010); Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument 
for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 471 (2001). 
 27. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each 
Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. 
6
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this Article evaluates the theory across multiple legal fields. By applying 
the sex discrimination argument to different forms of discrimination 
against sexual minorities, this Article explains how the theory’s 
universalism constitutes its greatest strength. 
The sex discrimination argument offers several practical and 
theoretical benefits over other approaches to gay civil rights. For 
example, instead of categorizing marriage as a stand-alone right that 
courts should elevate above all others, the sex discrimination argument 
recasts all state action based on sexual orientation as just another form of 
sex discrimination, placing sexual orientation discrimination within a 
settled constitutional framework that triggers heightened scrutiny in a 
variety of contexts.28 Likewise, because courts interpret constitutional 
claims alleging intentional sex discrimination coextensively with Title 
VII,29 a decision applying the sex discrimination argument to various 
instances of state discrimination against sexual minorities in areas such 
as housing, education, or adoption30 would effectively extend Title VII 
protections to gay workers as well.31 
Beyond the practical significance of such an approach, the theory 
draws critical attention to the fact that any regulation of sexual activity 
(whether by the government or private employers) works to reinforce 
gender stereotypes about how men and women ought to behave. For 
example, if the government extends certain rights to heterosexual women 
that it denies to lesbians, the state effectively regulates female sexual 
                                                                                                                     
Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334–35 (2014) [hereinafter Case, 
Legal Protections]; Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 
207–08 (2009); David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1703–04 (2002); I. Bennett Capers, Note, 
Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1158–59 (1991).  
 28. See Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and 
Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 536 (2001) [hereinafter Koppelman, 
A Reply to Stein] (summarizing the reach of the sex discrimination argument); Koppelman, Sex 
Discrimination, supra note 22, at 284–85 (“In short, any state action that discriminates against 
lesbians and gay men solely because they are gay is impermissible.”).  
 29. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role 
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 638 
(1992) (discussing various applications of the sex discrimination argument); Monica Diggs 
Mange, The Formal Equality Theory in Practice: The Inability of Current Antidiscrimination Law 
to Protect Conventional and Unconventional Persons, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 23 (2007). 
 30. See generally Jack M Balkin, Obergefell and Equality, BALKINIZATION (June 28, 2015, 
1:58 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/obergefell-and-equality.html (considering the 
application of Obergefell to instances of state discrimination).  
 31. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135–36 (1976) (noting the overlap between 
sex discrimination under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause); Mange, supra note 29, at 24 
(same); see also infra Subsection III.A.2 and accompanying discussion of the relationship 
between Title VII and equal protection. 
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behavior by restricting benefits only to those women who conform to the 
gender stereotype that requires women to desire men. In the Title VII 
context, the effeminate victim exception reinforces the gender stereotype 
that equates effeminacy with homosexuality. These gender norms do not 
exempt straight workers either. For example, the cultural expectation of 
opposite-sex desire calls upon straight employees to prove their 
heterosexuality at work through acts such as talking about their love lives 
and displaying pictures of their partners on their desks.32 Workers who 
do not conform to these norms are subject to sanctions by employers and 
coworkers who police gendered behavior at work and punish “suspected” 
homosexuals.33 In sum, the sex discrimination theory brings critical 
attention to numerous gender-based rules and expectations that limit the 
autonomy of all individuals in public and private spheres. 
Part I of this Article discusses the successful strategic approach that 
same-sex marriage advocates utilized to portray gay couples as ordinary 
plaintiffs who sought access to one of the “basic civil rights of man.”34 
Contrasting the discursive structures of marriage equality with those of 
Title VII, Part II explains how federal law does not simply fail to protect 
sexual minorities from discrimination. Indeed, by punishing accused 
harassers who come out as gay while “rewarding” those gay plaintiffs 
who conform to society’s preconceived notions of homosexuality, Title 
VII actually creates powerful incentives for gay employees to adhere to 
gendered expectations at work.35 Part III explains why the sex 
discrimination argument constitutes a potent tool for challenging gender 
stereotypes on multiple legal fronts. Rather than bury gay sexual 
identity—as proponents of marriage equality tended to do—the sex 
discrimination argument represents a more promising route going 
forward by providing courts with a mechanism for finally considering 
how presumptions of heterosexuality limit the individual freedom of gay 
and straight individuals alike.36  
 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Kramer, supra note 27, at 228 (discussing the cultural ubiquity of heterosexuality). 
 33. See infra Section II.A and accompanying discussion of the interaction between Title 
VII jurisprudence and workplace norms. 
 34. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009) (No. CV09-2292VRW), 2009 WL 1490740 
(quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 26, 2015) (“Their stories reveal that 
they seek not to denigrate marriage but rather to live their lives, or honor their spouses’ memory, 
joined by its bond.”). 
 35. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 813 (2002) (discussing cultural 
pressures placed on lesbians and gay men to “act[] straight”).  
 36. See Appleton, supra note 26, at 124 (explaining how the sex discrimination argument 
highlights universal harms). 
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Because the Supreme Court has long prohibited states and employers 
from policing the behavior of men and women based on gendered 
presumptions,37 the sex discrimination argument constitutes the best 
vehicle for highlighting the gender stereotypes manifest in sexual 
orientation discrimination. The cultural imperative requiring individuals 
to choose only partners of the opposite sex remains our society’s most 
enduring gender stereotype. Until that presumption is properly 
recognized as sex discrimination, dissonant pictures of wedding cakes 
and predators will continue to dominate gay imagery in the law. 
I.  THE MARRIAGE EQUALITY NARRATIVE 
Advocates for gay civil rights did not always prioritize same-sex 
marriage.38 After the Stonewall protests of 1969 and the birth of the 
modern gay rights movement, activists established a reform agenda that 
included abolishing anti-sodomy laws, passing hate-crimes legislation, 
and expanding employment protections for gay workers.39 Indeed, during 
the early waves of modern gay-rights activism, if the topic of same-sex 
marriage came up at all, advocates dismissed the notion as either 
hopelessly unattainable or dangerously assimilationist.40 
But when the Hawaii Supreme Court shocked the nation in 1993 and 
ruled in favor of Nina Baehr’s petition to marry her female partner in 
Baehr v. Lewin,41 the issue of same-sex marriage drew prominent national 
attention.42 Even then, though, many gay advocacy groups came to the 
movement kicking and screaming. In fact, so-called “boardroom gay” 
organizations like Lambda Legal and the ACLU had specifically urged 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982) (holding that 
“the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification . . . must be applied free of 
fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females”). 
 38. Patrick J. Egan & Kenneth Sherrill, Marriage and the Shifting Priorities of a New 
Generation of Lesbians and Gays, 38 POL. SCI. & POL. 229, 229 (2005) (noting that gay-rights 
organizations did not prioritize same-sex marriage until recently). 
 39. See id. (outlining policy changes pursued by gay activists); see also WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE 241–45 (2006) (discussing the evolution 
of gay civil rights); Mathew S. Nosanchuk, Response: No Substitutions, Please, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1989, 1997 (2012) (noting changes among gay-rights activists toward the issue of same-sex 
marriage). 
 40. Mary Ziegler, The Terms of the Debate: Litigation, Argumentative Strategies, and 
Coalitions in the Same-Sex Marriage Struggle, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 467, 475–77 (2012) 
(discussing changes in tactics among mainstream gay-rights organizations).  
 41. See 852 P.2d 44, 67–68 (Haw. 1993). 
 42. Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving Interstate Conflicts over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 63 FLA. 
L. REV. 47, 60 (2011) (asserting that Baehr “open[ed] the door” for state recognition of same-sex 
marriage); see also Michael J. Klarman, Judicial Statesmanship: Justice Breyer’s Concurring 
Opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 128 HARV. L. REV. 452, 454 (2014) (describing the national 
reaction following Baehr).  
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Baehr not to file her claim.43 Believing that the United States was not 
ready for gay marriage, Lambda Legal joined Baehr only after the state’s 
highest court announced its plans to evaluate the merits of Baehr’s 
claims.44  
In many ways, these groups’ reluctance to force change through 
litigation was based on a well-founded fear of public backlash.45 For 
example, soon after Baehr, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which limited the federal definition of marriage to opposite-
sex couples.46 In addition, states followed suit and passed “mini-
DOMAs” of their own.47 Reflecting the ongoing concern for avoiding 
public backlash, litigation on the marriage front following these 
developments oscillated between cases carefully selected by national 
organizations and other suits instigated by non-movement lawyers.48 
The most famous example of non-movement-initiated litigation was 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger,49 the constitutional challenge to California’s 
Proposition 8. In May 2009, Ted Olson and David Boies—prominent 
national lawyers who had faced each other in Bush v. Gore50—announced 
that they would pursue a constitutional case for same-sex marriage in 
federal court.51 To mainstream gay-rights groups that had focused on 
incremental change through public education and state court litigation, 
Boies and Olson’s federal lawsuit represented a risky move.52 In fact, just 
days before Boies and Olson filed their complaint in Perry, advocacy 
groups issued a joint statement entitled, “Why the ballot box and not the 
                                                                                                                     
 43. NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 1, at 105–06.  
 44. Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1250; NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 
1, at 105–06; Egan & Sherrill, supra note 38, at 229.  
 45. Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1250. 
 46. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) (discussing DOMA’s 
legislative history). 
 47. Brandzel, supra note 1, at 180 (reviewing the history of state marriage restrictions). 
 48. See Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 21, 31–33 (2010) (examining same-sex marriage litigation strategies); see also 
Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1245 (emphasizing the distinction between movement 
and non-movement lawyers).  
 49. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 
(9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); 
see also Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 618 (2014) 
(discussing the trajectory of the Perry litigation). 
 50. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Cummings & NeJaime; supra note 5, at 1299. 
 51. Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1299–1300 (discussing gay-rights groups’ 
reaction to the announcement). 
 52. Andrew Koppelman, Salvaging Perry, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 69, 69–70 (2012) 
(explaining why the Perry lawsuit dismayed mainstream gay-rights groups). 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/7
2015] MARRIAGE EQUALITY, WORKPLACE INEQUALITY 1109 
 
courts should be the next step on marriage in California.”53 Realizing that 
the stakes were too high to stay out of the case altogether, however, 
movement lawyers provided behind-the-scenes support after Boies and 
Olson proceeded with Perry anyway.54 To a large degree, the combined 
efforts of movement and non-movement lawyers in Baehr, Perry, and 
other cases laid the foundation for the Supreme Court’s final validation 
of same-sex marriage in Obergefell.55 Setting the stage for the Court’s 
ultimate ruling on the issue, movement lawyers tactically crafted their 
arguments to appeal to a hesitant judiciary by carefully selecting model 
plaintiffs and sympathetic stories.56  
A.  The Ordinary Gay Couples of Obergefell and Windsor 
Obergefell’s historic ruling in favor of same-sex-marriage embraced 
a long-running discursive strategy that focused on the stories of likeable, 
committed same-sex couples.57 Writing for the Obergefell majority, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy explained how James Obergefell and John 
Arthur had met two decades earlier, “started a life together,” and 
“establish[ed] a lasting committed relationship.”58 After John fell ill from 
ALS, the couple decided to wed. Because their home state of Ohio banned 
same-sex marriages, the couple flew in a medical transport plane to 
Maryland, which, unlike Ohio, recognized their union.59 Due to his 
failing health and physical inability to leave the plane, John married 
James on the tarmac in Baltimore.60 When John died three months later, 
however, Ohio refused to list James as John’s surviving spouse.61  
Prior to his death, John anticipated this situation and said: “I love 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Why the Ballot Box and Not the Courts Should Be the Next Step on Marriage in 
California, ACLU (May 2009), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ballot_ 
box_20090527.pdf.  
 54. Douglas NeJaime, The View from Below: Public Interest Lawyering, Social Change, 
and Adjudication, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 182, 192 (2013) (discussing the litigation history 
of Perry). 
 55. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 28 (U.S. June 26, 2015); see also 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (legalizing same-sex 
marriage); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (legalizing civil unions); see also infra 
Subsection III.A.1 and accompanying discussion of recent rulings on same-sex marriage; Nancy 
C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle Bargle”: The Inevitability of 
Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17, 19–20 (2014) (summarizing 
developments in same-sex marriage litigation).  
 56. Levit, supra note 48, at 22–23 (discussing the theoretical tensions raised by litigation 
strategies). 
 57. Obergefell, slip op. at 4–6. 
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. Id. at 4–5. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 5.  
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[James] and want our last days together to be a celebration of our love. 
How can we celebrate when Ohio law requires that my death certificate 
say I am not married and that I have no surviving spouse?”62 
Characterizing the outcome as a “state-imposed separation,” Justice 
Kennedy explained how Ohio’s same-sex marriage ban caused the couple 
to “remain strangers even in death.”63 According to Justice Kennedy, the 
Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from injuring couples like John 
and James in this way. As such, the Obergefell Court held that the 
Constitution required Ohio to extend the fundamental right of marriage 
to same-sex couples on equal terms with opposite-sex couples.64   
This was not the first time that Justice Kennedy had reflected on the 
costs of marriage restrictions. He had utilized a similar narrative trend to 
highlight the harm that these limits placed on ordinary, same-sex couples 
in United States v. Windsor65—the Supreme Court decision that predated 
Obergefell by two years.66 “Edie,” as Edith Windsor’s lawyers referred 
to her before the trial court, married Thea Clara Spyer.67 Her brief stated: 
Prior to Thea’s death in February 2009, Edie and Thea spent 
over four decades together in a loving, committed union . . . 
. [W]hile grieving the loss of the love of her life, Edie also 
had to face the injustice of the federal government’s refusal 
to recognize her marriage.68  
Thus, Edith Windsor’s lawyers articulated their client’s harm in both 
dignitary and monetary terms. In addition to enduring the loss of a four-
decade-long, loving union, Edith had to pay $363,053 in estate taxes that 
would not have come due had the federal government accepted her 
marriage to Thea.69  
Reviewing her claim in Windsor, Justice Kennedy explained how the 
couple had “met in New York City in 1963 and began a long-term 
relationship.”70 Justice Kennedy noted that New York had already 
recognized their union and that the two women welcomed the “rights and 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Brief of Plaintiffs–Appellees at 7, Obergefell v. Himes, No. 14-3057, 2014 WL 
1745560 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2014), cert. granted, sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 
(Jan. 16, 2015), rev’d slip op. at 28.  
 63. Obergefell, slip op. at 5. 
 64. Id. at 22–23. 
 65. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, 
Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 
8435(BSJ)(JCF)), 2011 WL 3165327 [hereinafter Windsor Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law].  
 68. Id.  
 69. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 70. Id. 
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responsibilities” that came with marriage.71 According to Justice 
Kennedy, under such circumstances the Fifth Amendment prohibited the 
federal government from “demean[ing] the couple, whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects.”72  
Without question, Obergefell’s reference to the “grave and continuing 
harm”73 caused by marriage restrictions and Windsor’s affirmation of 
same-sex couples’ “personhood and dignity”74 constituted major 
victories for sexual minorities. At the same time, however, the context in 
which James Obergefell and Edith Windsor secured those rights bears 
noting. As framed by her lawyers, Edith Windsor’s claim centered on the 
loss of the “love of her life” and the tangible economic harm she suffered 
due to the government’s refusal to honor that loss.75 Likewise, James 
Obergefell described the damage caused by Ohio’s marriage restriction 
in non-economic terms. As he stated shortly before his husband’s death: 
“[T]his is about more than money or benefits. John will die soon. I love 
him deeply; more than any other person on earth. I want the world to 
know that we share the highest commitment two people can make to each 
other in our society.”76 
By emphasizing the real-world consequences of discrimination (both 
romantic and financial), parties in these cases framed their injuries in 
terms of relationships that could not have been more traditional, but for 
their sexual orientation.77 In the worlds described in Obergefell, Windsor, 
and other recent same-sex marriage decisions, gay couples fall in love, 
grow old together, and support each other through illness. In large part, 
this choice of frames represented a pragmatic litigation tactic. Minority 
groups have often attempted to gain social acceptance by tapping into 
shared cultural values and downplaying differences.78 According to this 
strategy, if courts view plaintiffs through culturally intelligible frames, 
then decision makers can better comprehend gay couples’ demands for 
recognition.79 Thus, to the extent that these frames emphasized the 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 2694.  
 72. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 73. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 22 (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
 74. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 75. Windsor Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 67, at 1.  
 76. Brief of Plaintiffs–Appellees at 8, Obergefell v. Himes, No. 14-3057, 2014 WL 
1745560 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2014) (alteration in original), cert. granted, sub nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (Jan. 16, 2015), rev’d slip op. at 28.  
 77. Peter Applebome, Reveling in Her Supreme Court Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, 
at A24 (discussing the factual background of Windsor). 
 78. Nosanchuk, supra note 39, at 1994–95 (discussing debates within the gay community 
over conformity). 
 79. See Yoshino, supra note 35, at 930 (examining instances of assimilation in American 
law). 
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presence of long-term intimate bonding within the gay community, such 
narratives helped counteract a reductive view of homosexuality that 
focused exclusively on sexual acts.80  
But a strategy that embraces essentialized representations of 
homosexuality also has its costs. For example, choosing a frame that 
emphasizes gay couples’ ordinary existence can mask cultural rules 
related to gender and sexuality that ultimately drive discriminatory acts 
against gay individuals.81 In addition, the characterization of marriage as 
the springboard to public acceptance suggests that once sexual minorities 
have access to this “rewarding and cherished institution”82—as they do 
now—then the gay community will have won the battle for equality. In 
the process, this narrative risks obscuring the animating cause of 
discrimination against lesbians and gay men while diverting energy away 
from other important goals such as combating workplace 
discrimination.83  
B.  Narrative Costs: Concealing Sexuality, Deprioritizing 
Other Rights 
Although the current rhetorical approach to same-sex marriage has 
yielded tremendous success in the courtroom, any litigation strategy 
comes with tradeoffs. The most fundamental tradeoff involves rights and 
freedoms that individuals may sacrifice in exchange for marriage. Indeed, 
prior to Obergefell, legal scholars frequently questioned whether the gay 
community should pursue same-sex marriage at all.84 These debates 
largely separated those thinkers who favored integration from those who 
espoused a more radical perspective on the state’s ability to favor certain 
relational forms over others.85  
Professors Nan Hunter and William Eskridge, for example, supported 
same-sex marriage but also acknowledged the gendered baggage that 
came with the institution.86 Professor Hunter argued that same-sex 
                                                                                                                     
 80. See id. at 847–48.  
 81. Levit, supra note 48, at 37–38 (discussing the topic of sexuality in the same-sex 
marriage setting). 
 82. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003). 
 83. GARY MUCCIARONI, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT POLITICS, at ix (2008) (examining the 
categorization of marriage as a primary gay civil right and the risk that, through such 
categorization, the gay community may lose sight of the “many other important goals of the gay 
rights movement”).  
 84. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From 
Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1355–58, 1360 (2010) (discussing 
debates over assimilation among feminists, queer theorists, and trans theorists). 
 85. Id.  
 86. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner’s Sex and Reason: 
Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 353, 356 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge, 
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marriage can “denaturalize the historical construction of gender at the 
heart of marriage.”87 Similarly, Professor Eskridge believed that gay 
marriage had the potential to erode gender hierarchies within marriage.88 
On the other hand, Professor Katherine Franke expressed skepticism 
toward a vision of liberty that exposed sexual minorities to state control.89 
She questioned a political movement that enabled state players to favor 
only those personal associations that conformed to a predefined notion of 
legitimacy.90 Likewise, Professor Nancy Polikoff expressed deep 
reservations about a marriage strategy that analogized gay relationships 
to heterosexual marriages while failing to attack the gendered structures 
of the institution.91 But even these skeptics acknowledged that, as long as 
marriage existed as a legal form, the state should at least extend rights to 
gay couples in a nondiscriminatory fashion.92 
Although the foregoing debate often focused on whether the gay 
community should pursue same-sex marriage, it also informs the present 
analysis of the effect that the fight for same-sex marriage has had on other 
civil rights such as employment protections. Just as Professor Franke 
critiqued same-sex marriage for privileging certain family forms over 
others,93 advocates for marriage equality privileged certain legal rights 
over others. For example, by repeatedly categorizing marriage as the gay 
community’s ultimate civil right, the campaign for same-sex marriage 
ranked the rights of gay individuals just as some scholars feared that it 
ranked family forms.  
Proponents of same-sex marriage often implied or directly asserted 
that once they prevailed on this issue then the gay community would 
                                                                                                                     
Gaylegal Agenda] (book review); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist 
Inquiry, 1 L. & SEXUALITY REV. 9, 18 (1991) [hereinafter Hunter, Marriage Law] (explaining how 
legalization may threaten gender systems). 
 87. Hunter, Marriage Law, supra note 86, at 18; Nosanchuk, supra note 39, at 2006 
(examining Hunter’s contention that same-sex couples can reform marriage). 
 88. Eskridge, Gaylegal Agenda, supra note 86, at 356. 
 89. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1399, 1426 (2004) (examining the legal regulation of sexual behavior).  
 90. Franke, Politics, supra note 13, at 240 (critiquing the gay community’s “desire for 
governance”). 
 91. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian 
Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 
1535, 1549 (1993) (arguing that the underlying critique of gender roles stemming from the 
institution of marriage becomes “not only secondary but marginalized, even silenced”). 
 92. See Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2687 (2008) 
[hereinafter Franke, Longing]; Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 37, 53–54 (2011) (discussing debates among gender theorists over same-sex marriage). 
 93. See Franke, Longing, supra note 92, at 2689; Franke, Politics, supra note 13, at 245.  
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prevail completely.94 This conclusion flowed logically from the 
characterization of marriage equality as “the last great civil rights 
struggle.”95 Indeed, the Supreme Court echoed this sentiment when it 
ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in Obergefell. Describing the 
“transcendent importance of marriage,” Justice Kennedy used almost 
poetic language to explain how marriage rises “from the most basic 
human needs” and “is essential to our most profound hopes and 
aspirations.”96 But with marriage placed on such a high civil-rights 
pedestal, what do lesbians and gay men fight for now that they have 
attained that right? Professor Patricia Williams has discussed the value of 
becoming “multilingual in the semantics of evaluating rights.”97 Yet the 
modern discourse over gay rights has become monolingual in its singular 
fixation on one right—marriage—at the cost of downplaying other 
interests such as employment protections that remain vitally important to 
gay individuals.98 
The gloss of formal equality provided by the same-sex marriage 
narrative has given rise to the false impression that lesbians and gay men 
uniformly prioritize that right above all others.99 But even a cursory look 
at the diverse needs and desires of the gay community demonstrates the 
continuing importance of employment protections to gay workers. For 
example, in 2003—the same year that Massachusetts became the first 
state in the nation to legalize same-sex marriage100— lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) Americans responded to a national 
survey asking them to rank their policy priorities. All respondents, across 
every age category, listed “workplace discrimination” as their top 
problem.101 Young LGBT respondents ranked “civil marriage” as the 
third-most-important right, and older LGBT respondents did not even list 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Adler, supra note 12, at 187–88 (outlining predictions made by proponents of same-sex 
marriage). 
 95. Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Michael Joseph Gross, Gay Is the New Black?, ADVOCATE (Nov. 16, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.advocate.com/print/news/2008/11/16/gay-new-black (referencing cover).  
 96. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 26, 2015). 
 97. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 149 (1991). 
 98. See Sheila Rose Foster, The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of Symbolism: Some 
Thoughts on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 319, 322–
24 (1998) (critiquing the “strategic essentialism” of marriage advocacy); id. at 326 (“The energy 
being placed into seeking marriage benefits is overshadowing, and it is sacrificing other important 
material goals . . . .”).  
 99. See Feinberg, supra note 11, at 258 (“There is far from universal agreement within the 
LGBT rights movement, however, regarding the prioritization of marriage equality.”); Dean 
Spade, Under the Cover of Gay Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 79, 85 (2013) 
(summarizing the concern that same-sex marriage will yield only “surface change”). 
 100. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003). 
 101. Egan & Sherrill, supra note 38, at 231 tbl.3. 
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marriage as a top-five priority.102 A decade later, the importance of 
employment protections did not change. Even with massive media 
attention and a cascade of favorable court rulings, fifty-seven percent of 
LGBT respondents still listed workplace rights as a “top priority.”103 
This widespread support for employment protections among the gay 
community challenges the standard characterization of marriage as the 
ultimate right from which all other rights flow. Indeed, many gay 
employees have practical reasons for caring more about 
nondiscrimination rules on the job. As noted above, sexual orientation 
discrimination remains regrettably common in American workplaces.104 
This reality disproportionally affects economically vulnerable gay 
workers who cannot afford to reveal their sexual orientation on the job 
(let alone get married) until they have some measure of security that 
doing so will not cost them their livelihoods.105 What lesbian employee, 
for example, would publicly exchange vows with her partner on Saturday 
if her boss could legally fire her the following Monday? In this sense, 
marriage rights and employment rights interrelate. As sexual minorities 
enjoy more protections in diverse settings, they gain cultural legitimacy 
and the confidence to claim those rights.106 History shows as much: The 
pioneering states that first extended marriage rights to same-sex couples 
did so only after they had first enacted workplace nondiscrimination 
laws.107 The connection between the two sets of protections demonstrates 
how, contrary to common belief, marriage is not simply an umbrella 
protection that stands above all others.  
In addition to distorting the regulatory needs of gay individuals, the 
current marriage narrative has masked the sexual identity of the 
individuals involved. This was true even in marriage decisions that fully 
validated the dignitary interests of gay couples. For example, in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,108 the first state decision 
legalizing same-sex marriage, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
described how the couples petitioning for marriage went to church and 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Id. 
 103. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 6, at 9 (reporting that fifty-three percent of LGBT 
respondents listed same-sex marriage as a “top priority”). 
 104. See Pizer et al., supra note 7, at 721 (discussing rates of workplace discrimination 
against sexual minorities); Tilcsik, supra note 8, at 614 (same). 
 105. See Foster, supra note 98, at 325–27 (considering potential costs that members of the 
gay community may experience from “coming out”).  
 106. MUCCIARONI, supra note 83, at 2 (examining the cultural meaning of gay civil rights). 
 107. E.J. Graff, Free to Work, Free to Marry, AM. PROSPECT (May 14, 2013), http:// 
prospect.org/article/free-work-free-marry (outlining the relationship between workplace rights 
and marriage rights for the gay community).  
 108. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
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were “educators, therapists, and a computer engineer.”109 Similarly, in 
Bishop v. Smith,110 a significant federal appellate court decision that 
immediately preceded Obergefell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit explained how “Mary Bishop and Sharon Baldwin are in a 
long-term committed relationship and seek to marry. They live together 
in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, where they both work for the Tulsa World 
newspaper[, and] [t]hey jointly own their home and other property.”111 
Through these vignettes, readers learned many details about the couples’ 
lives—their workplaces, their interests, their church-going habits—but 
very little about their same-sex desires.112 
This is not to say that such decisions entirely ignored the parties’ 
sexuality. For example, Windsor acknowledged the “moral and sexual 
choices” of the individuals involved113 and Obergefell mentioned the 
growing recognition that “sexual orientation is both a normal expression 
of human sexuality and immutable.”114 But such references were 
relatively rare in most same-sex marriage decisions, which, if they made 
allusions to same-sex desire at all, still focused more intently on the 
parties’ ordinary, day-to-day lives.  
By sidestepping the issue of sexuality, litigants hoped to redirect 
attention away from the bedroom to a broader discussion of the gay 
community’s right to equal citizenship.115 But given that sexual 
orientation discrimination is rooted in social disapproval of 
homosexuality, this tactic failed to interrogate the motivations behind 
anti-gay bias.116 In fact, the strategic decision to avoid speaking of gay 
sex may have ultimately reinforced the historical taboo associated with 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 949–55; Adler, supra note 12, 168–71 (discussing images of gay plaintiffs in 
Goodridge).  
 110. 760 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 247 
(2013) (discussing the vision of marriage presented in Windsor). 
 113. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 114. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 8 (U.S. June 26, 2015) (citing Brief for 
Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. at 7–17, Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 WL 1004713 
(Mar. 6, 2015)). 
 115. See Soucek, supra note 3, at 782 (explaining the litigation tactic of downplaying 
differences). 
 116. Katherine Turk, “Our Militancy Is in Our Openness”: Gay Employment Rights 
Activism in California and the Question of Sexual Orientation in Sex Equality Law, 31 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 423, 451 (2013) (discussing the history of obtaining employment protections for sexual 
minorities in California).  
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discussing homosexual acts.117 By relegating gay sexuality to the realm 
of the “unspeakable,” the unnamed acts became all the more 
prominent.118 Rather than taking advantage of the chance to characterize 
gay sexuality as a normal human condition, the silence in some marriage 
cases sent the countervailing message that states should extend marriage 
rights to gay couples despite their sexuality. Although courts and 
advocates may have believed that ignoring same-sex desire represented 
the path of least resistance to attaining public acceptance, this strategy of 
gay erasure complicates the task of extending marriage victories to other 
civil rights contexts.119 
Indeed, as the following employment law decisions make clear, when 
advocates refrain from telling stories related to gay sexuality, others will 
tell those stories for them. In contrast to today’s historic marriage rulings, 
modern workplace discrimination cases involving gay parties do not bury 
gay sexuality, but, instead, highlight it. Gay figures are not innocuous, 
but instead seen as threatening and deviant.120 Thus, the project of 
extending employment rights to gay workers is as much about 
reinterpreting doctrine as it is about retelling stories in a way that no 
longer relies on reductive representations of same-sex desire. To 
understand the different discursive challenges present in employment 
law—as compared to same-sex marriage jurisprudence—the existing 
stories of workplace discrimination must first be told. 
II.  EMPLOYMENT INEQUALITY: THE SEXUALIZED NARRATIVE 
OF GAY HARASSMENT 
The representations of gay individuals in Title VII case law differ 
dramatically from marriage decisions in both discourse and rights. While 
the marriage cases have expanded gay rights without talking about gay 
sexuality, the employment cases talk about gay sexuality without 
expanding rights. The operation of Title VII is quite clear: Federal law 
does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.121 If a person sues his 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See Laura I. Appleman, Oscar Wilde’s Long Tail: Framing Sexual Identity in the Law, 
70 MD. L. REV. 985, 999 (2011) (analyzing the historical prohibition against naming homosexual 
acts). 
 118. Id. at 999–1000 (considering the consequences of certain rhetorical strategies). 
 119. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and the Body, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
201, 209–20 (2012) (examining the presence of gay erasure in arguments involving sexual 
minorities). 
 120. See infra Section II.B and accompanying discussion of representations of gay figures in 
Title VII cases. 
 121. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Clare 
Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the “Because of . . . Sex” 
Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 77 (2007) (summarizing Title VII rulings 
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employer alleging that a business fired him for being gay, he will almost 
certainly lose. Courts that reject these claims explain that Title VII 
protects against sex-based discrimination and not sexual orientation 
discrimination.122 Although a few recent cases have declined to put a 
blanket ban on sexual orientation discrimination claims, judicial authority 
still weighs heavily against gay plaintiffs.123 
Over the past two decades, courts have developed two exceptions to 
the general rule that a party’s sexual orientation is irrelevant to Title VII. 
Both of these exceptions have occurred in the area of sexual harassment 
law, a form of sex discrimination.124 Justice Antonin Scalia crafted the 
first exception—this Article calls it the “predatory gay exception”—over 
fifteen years ago in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.125 In 
Oncale, Justice Scalia said that in cases of same-sex harassment, victims 
can win Title VII claims by offering “credible evidence that the harasser 
was homosexual.”126 Plaintiffs have followed Justice Scalia’s cue in the 
years following Oncale, often searching desperately for “credible 
evidence” of their harasser’s sexuality.127 
The second exception—this Article calls it the “effeminate victim 
exception”—turns the relevance of homosexuality on its head. In Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,128 Justice William Brennan explained how Title 
VII bars employers from engaging in sex stereotyping, which entails 
“evaluat[ing] employees by assuming or insisting that they match[] the 
stereotype associated with their group.”129 As such, Title VII forbids 
                                                                                                                     
involving sexual orientation discrimination and noting that “Title VII does not protect against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation”). 
 122. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 34–36 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the “well-settled” 
principle that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination); DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 
329–30; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).  
 123. See infra Subsection III.A.2 and accompanying discussion of the emergence of the sex 
discrimination argument under Title VII; see also Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights 
Violations=Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex, 62 FLA. L. REV. 895, 918 (2010) (noting the 
general consensus among federal judges that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination); Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil 
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2177–78 (2007) (discussing Title VII’s lack 
of protection against sexual orientation discrimination). 
 124. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–69 (1986); see also Katherine M. Franke, 
What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 692–96 (1997) [hereinafter 
Franke, What’s Wrong] (arguing that scholars and courts have failed to offer a sufficient 
theoretical justification for connecting sex discrimination to sexual harassment). 
 125. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 126. Id. at 80. 
 127. See Clarke, supra note 16, at 538–40 (discussing the judicial tendency to conflate 
concepts of sexuality and desire). 
 128. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).  
 129. Id. at 251.  
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employers from punishing workers for failing to adhere to gender-based 
expectations normally associated with their sex (e.g., women will act 
“femininely” and men will act “manly”).130 Applying this rule to gay 
victims of harassment, some courts now validate claims brought by gay 
men if they can prove that their effeminacy (and not their sexual 
orientation) caused their harassment.131 Less common but still present are 
cases in which women highlight their masculine mannerisms but avoid 
discussing their sexual orientation.132 
In contrast to the imagery of same-sex marriage, these cases do not 
bury sexuality, but instead highlight the topic. The predatory gay 
exception punishes a certain kind of homosexuality—predatory, 
aggressive, and compulsive—while the effeminate victim exception 
offers refuge to certain gay victims who satisfy cultural stereotypes about 
homosexuality.133 Both areas of the law demonstrate the need for a 
refocused legal framework that can evaluate the rights of sexual 
minorities without relying upon reductive representations of same-sex 
desire. 
A.  Predatory Gay Exception 
Before Oncale, courts differed on the question of whether Title VII 
applied to instances of same-sex harassment. While some courts offered 
limited support for such claims, others held that plaintiffs could never sue 
members of their own sex for sexual harassment.134 After Oncale 
authorized such claims, gender theorists disagreed about whether gay 
workers benefited from the decision. Those who viewed Oncale as a gay-
rights breakthrough claimed that plaintiffs could employ the decision to 
                                                                                                                     
 130. See Jeannette Cox, Disability Stigma and Intraclass Discrimination, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
429, 440 & n.41 (2010) (explaining how Price Waterhouse prohibited businesses from utilizing 
gender stereotypes against employees); Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, 
Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 734 (2010) 
(discussing Price Waterhouse’s potential to alter gender dynamics at work). 
 131. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009) (critiquing the 
contention that only effeminate heterosexual men—not homosexual men—can bring gender 
stereotyping claims). 
 132. See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1035–36 (8th Cir. 
2010) (outlining the claim of a gender-nonconforming female plaintiff). 
 133. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 1341–42 (discussing common cultural assumptions 
about gay sexuality). 
 134. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994); Goluszek 
v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (barring a same-sex harassment claim 
brought by a male plaintiff); Jeremy S. Barber, Comment, Re-Orienting Sexual Harassment: Why 
Federal Legislation Is Needed to Cure Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 493, 
494–95 (2002) (noting that Oncale eliminated the ban on recognizing same-sex harassment).  
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finally assert claims for sexual orientation discrimination.135 Other 
scholars, however, viewed Justice Scalia’s reference to “credible 
evidence” of a harasser’s homosexuality as an ominous warning to the 
gay community.136 Professor Janet Halley, for example, explained how 
the decision could stir “homosexual panic” at workplaces wherein self-
identified “straight” employees would feel inclined to accuse gay men 
and lesbians of harassment.137 Likewise, Professor Vicki Schultz feared 
that any desire-based approach to harassment would disadvantage sexual 
minorities who society still viewed as embodying “offensive 
sexuality.”138  
In many ways, the different predictions about Oncale’s effect on gay 
workers involved two entirely different subjects. Optimists focused on 
Oncale’s transformative potential for gay victims of harassment.139 
Critics focused on the magnifying effect that Justice Scalia’s search for 
“credible evidence” of homosexuality would have on accused gay 
harassers.140 Today, with over fifteen years of judicial decisions applying 
Oncale to same-sex harassment claims, trends in the case law show that 
courts have focused disproportionately on the question of whether an 
accused harasser is “currently a practicing homosexual.”141 In other 
words, even though Oncale articulated several evidentiary routes for 
proving same-sex harassment,142 the harasser’s desire for the victim still 
constitutes the most popular way to make out a Title VII claim in post-
Oncale decisions.143  
                                                                                                                     
 135. See Barber, supra note 134, at 506 (examining the scholarly response to Oncale); Sonya 
Smallets, Recent Developments, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services: A Victory for Gay and 
Lesbian Rights?, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 136, 136–37 (1999) (same). 
 136. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 137. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182, 
195 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); accord Clarke, supra note 16, at 
589–91 (analyzing harassment cases involving gay workers). 
 138. Vicki Schultz, Talking About Harassment, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 417, 428–29 (2001); see also 
Mary Coombs, Title VII and Homosexual Harassment After Oncale: Was It a Victory?, 6 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 113, 126 (1999) (discussing the risks of heightened homophobia created 
by Oncale). 
 139. E.g., Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2004) 
(“As a case clarifying the rules of sexual harassment law, Oncale has the potential to help straight 
and gay victims of same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace, in schools, in public housing, 
even in the streets.”).  
 140. See Clarke, supra note 16, at 590 (noting the problem that plaintiffs “are now able to 
subject alleged harassers to inquisition about their sexual histories and desires through 
discovery”); Halley, supra note 137, at 195 (expressing concerns that persons with “homosexual 
panic” may sue under Oncale).  
 141. Jones v. Potter, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 n.3 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 142. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998). 
 143. Diefenbach, supra note 121, at 49 (studying post-Oncale federal decisions and finding 
a disproportionate number of cases focusing on the harasser’s sexual orientation). 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/7
2015] MARRIAGE EQUALITY, WORKPLACE INEQUALITY 1121 
 
So how exactly does a court find “credible evidence” of 
homosexuality? As one might guess, the task is not easy. The search for 
an alleged harasser’s sexual orientation can cause plaintiffs to falsely 
accuse coworkers of homosexuality, while defendants can falsely deny 
their desire for members of the same sex. One way to prove 
homosexuality is to directly pose the question to the accused harasser, as 
one plaintiff did during discovery: “Admit or Deny that you have had sex 
or sexual relations with another man at any time during the period of your 
employment . . . .”144 Conversely, a party can present testimony from 
coworkers about their views on the accused harasser’s sexuality, as one 
employer did by collecting twelve affidavits from coworkers attesting to 
the defendant’s straight lifestyle.145 Unsurprisingly, definitive answers 
are hard to come by in these circumstances.  
Oncale authorized this type of inquiry into a defendant’s sexuality. 
Not only did the Court require “credible evidence” of homosexuality, but 
it also cautioned against punishing mere “horseplay” at work.146 In 
practice, the “horseplay” rule opposes the “credible evidence” rule. So 
long as plaintiffs cannot definitively prove that defendants desired 
members of their own sex, courts often characterize even highly 
sexualized conduct as “horseplay.”147 Consider the facts of Oncale itself. 
Joseph Oncale worked on an all-male oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico.148 
Three months into his job, Oncale quit after two co-workers grabbed him 
in a shower on the employer’s premises, forced a bar of soap up his anus, 
and threatened to rape him.149 Unable to determine whether this incident 
constituted sexual harassment or horseplay, the Supreme Court remanded 
the case and suggested three ways that Oncale could prove the existence 
of same-sex harassment. He could prove that: (1) the harassers were gay; 
(2) the harassers were “motivated by general hostility” toward the 
presence of members of their own sex in the workplace; or (3) members 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Vaughn v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., No. 04-1633, 2006 WL 950109, at *1 (E.D. 
La. Apr. 7, 2006) (denying motion to compel). 
 145. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 846 (E.D. Va. 2002); see 
also Clarke, supra note 16, at 590 (discussing discovery requests involving sexual orientation). 
 146. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82. 
 147. See Coombs, supra note 138, at 127 (examining the application of the horseplay rule to 
heterosexual men). 
 148. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.  
 149. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118–19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 
523 U.S. 75 (1998); see also Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other 
Forms of Heterosexual “Horseplay:” Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace Gender 
Hierarchies, and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale, 11 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 155, 157, 159–61 (1999) (examining Oncale’s factual and procedural background).  
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of the opposite sex received better treatment from the harassers.150 But, 
by process of elimination, it became clear that the first evidentiary route 
constituted Oncale’s only viable theory on remand.151 The second 
evidentiary route did not apply because no evidence demonstrated that 
the two attackers disliked other men, and the third evidentiary route did 
not apply because the all-male oil rig did not employ women who could 
serve as comparators.152 Therefore, the simple question on remand was 
whether the shower incident constituted gay harassment or straight 
horseplay.  
Without proof of the alleged harasser’s homosexuality, judicial 
determinations tend to fall on the horseplay side of the line.153 For 
example, in Linville v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,154 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that one man grabbing his 
coworker’s scrotum multiple times was “crude” but not sexual 
harassment.155 In another instance, the same court found that attempting 
to stick a shovel up another man’s anus, among other acts, was 
“inappropriate and vulgar” but not harassment based on sex.156 Likewise, 
in Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc.,157 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit determined that a harasser who talked about having anal 
sex with a victim, forced the victim’s face down on his crotch, and forced 
the victim to touch the harasser’s crotch was merely engaged in 
“horseplay.”158 In these and other cases, absent proof of the harasser’s 
explicit sexual desire for the victim, courts have declined to infer desire-
based motives from the sexualized acts themselves.159  
Although straight men who grab their coworkers’ scrotums and 
attempt to penetrate other men’s anuses are engaged in “horseplay,” the 
picture is very different for those who affirmatively speak about their 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81 (listing three “evidentiary route[s]” that plaintiffs can pursue 
to prove same-sex harassment). 
 151. See Philip McGough, Same-Sex Harassment: Do Either Price Waterhouse or Oncale 
Support the Ninth Circuit’s Holding in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. that Same-
Sex Harassment Based on Failure to Conform to Gender Stereotypes Is Actionable?, 22 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 206, 230, 232 n.153 (2004) (noting the inapplicability of the other evidentiary 
routes to Oncale’s case).  
 152. See id.  
 153. See generally Clarke, supra note 16, at 562–63 (discussing the horseplay rule).  
 154. 335 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2003).  
 155. Id. at 824.  
 156. McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 541–42, 544 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 157. 417 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 158. Id. at 665–66.  
 159. See Clarke, supra note 16, at 566–69 (summarizing same-sex harassment cases 
involving sexual aggression). 
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same-sex desire.160 For example, in Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc.,161 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the claim of John 
Cherry who worked on a survey crew with other men.162 One month into 
Cherry’s tenure with his employer, a male coworker sent Cherry a text 
message saying “I want cock” and invited Cherry to wear the coworker’s 
underwear and spend the night at his house.163 Reviewing the record, the 
Fifth Circuit found more than enough evidence to conclude that the 
coworker’s sexual propositions occurred “because of sex” in violation of 
Title VII.164  
Although fewer reported cases involve female–female harassment, 
some courts have found that out-lesbian defendants harassed plaintiffs, 
but self-identified “straight” women did not necessarily desire their 
victims.165 Consider the case of Cromer-Kendall v. District of 
Columbia.166 There, Barbara Cromer-Kendall alleged that her female 
supervisor encouraged Cromer-Kendall to leave her boyfriend.167 The 
supervisor allegedly told Cromer-Kendall that she loved her, asked the 
plaintiff to spend the night at her house, and fondled the plaintiff’s 
breast.168 Categorizing this as desire-based harassment, the court 
observed that “the connotations of sexual interest in [the plaintiff] 
certainly suggest that [the supervisor] might be sexually oriented toward 
members of the same sex.”169  
But compare Cromer-Kendall to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Love 
v. Motiva Enterprises LLC.170 In that case, Connie Love claimed that her 
female coworker harassed her and propositioned her for sexual favors.171 
According to Love, the coworker “ran her finger under Love’s bra strap 
and her underwear,” “rubbed her breasts against Love,” and locked 
herself in a changing room with Love while demanding “favors.”172 After 
reviewing Love’s claim, the Fifth Circuit held that these incidents did not 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See Coombs, supra note 138, at 126–27 (explaining how courts often view harassment 
by straight defendants as “non-actionable horseplay,” whereas sexual desire for the victim is 
assumed with gay men who “engage in sexualized behavior towards other men”). 
 161. 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012).  
 162. Id. at 185.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 188–89. 
 165. See Clarke, supra note 16, at 584–85 (discussing the judicial treatment of openly gay 
workers). 
 166. 326 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 167. Id. at 52–53. 
 168. Id. at 53–54. 
 169. Id. at 57 (citing Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010 (7th Cir.1999)). 
 170. 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 171. Id. at 902; id. at 905 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 172. Id. at 902–03 (majority opinion). 
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amount to implicit proposals for sex.173 The Fifth Circuit further held that 
Love failed “to present credible evidence” that the coworker was 
homosexual, and therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment against Love.174  
The lessons from these cases make it clear that courts generally apply 
a strict standard for proving homosexual desire. This approach to same-
sex harassment has several practical and theoretical implications for gay 
workers. Most fundamentally, courts’ reluctance to infer desire-based 
intent from the sexualized acts of same-sex coworkers exemplifies the 
heterosexual foundations of sexual harassment law.175 As Justice Scalia 
noted in Oncale, the inference of discrimination is “easy” to draw in 
male–female harassment cases because instances of male–female 
harassment normally involve “explicit or implicit proposals of sexual 
activity.”176 But, of course, such cases are “easy” only if one presumes 
the heterosexuality of the harasser.177 According to this frame, the 
harasser is straight until proven otherwise.178 But the very same 
sexualized propositions that give rise to a Title VII claim in opposite-sex 
interactions tend to fail in the same-sex setting unless courts are utterly 
convinced of the harasser’s homosexuality. 
Not only does the search for desire reveal Title VII’s heteronormative 
underpinnings, it constitutes a vastly under-inclusive approach to 
ferreting out instances of workplace mistreatment that occur because of 
sex. As many scholars have noted, sexual harassment is often less a 
function of sexual attraction and more a function of maintaining gender 
hierarchies at work.179 Given this reality, when exactly does towel-
snapping and crotch-grabbing constitute asexual bullying and when does 
such behavior constitute a crude method for policing gendered behavior 
at work? Drawing the line either way presents risks. On one hand, 
affixing a “sexual harassment label” to every single incident of sexualized 
conduct on the job risks sanitizing the workplace and suppressing 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Id. at 903. 
 174. Id. 903–04. 
 175. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1699–1700, 1708 (outlining heterosexual presumptions 
in Title VII). 
 176. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 177. See Franke, What’s Wrong, supra note 124, at 735–36 (critiquing a desire-based view 
of harassment). 
 178. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1745 (arguing that Oncale invited courts to engage in 
“very ugly lines of factual inquiry”). 
 179. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1169, 1188–1220 (1998); Franke, What’s Wrong, supra note 124, at 740, 742, 760–61; Vicki 
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686 (1998); see also Martin 
J. Katz, Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND. L.J. 101, 103 (2004) (arguing 
that courts have favored an attraction-based view of harassment). 
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harmless forms of sexual expression.180 Conversely, limiting liability to 
self-identified gay harassers provides safe harbor to “straight” harassers 
who can regulate the masculine and feminine behaviors of their 
coworkers through acts of same-sex sexual aggression. 
So why exactly did Joseph Oncale’s coworkers shove a bar of soap up 
his anus? Under today’s same-sex harassment jurisprudence, 
“homosexual desire” constitutes the best answer for winning in court. But 
judges have been too quick to ignore the possibility of a “straight” 
harasser’s desire for members of his own sex and too slow to 
acknowledge that sexual assault often involves non-desire-based 
motivations that still occur because of sex. If one man simulates raping 
another man, the harasser’s physical assault may have nothing to do with 
desire, but it can still effectively regulate gender-specific workplace 
norms by punishing victims for their perceived weakness or discomfort 
with working in a hypermasculine setting.181 Just as simulated rape 
constitutes an “easy” case of opposite-sex harassment, it ought to 
constitute an “easy” case when perpetrators use same-sex harassment to 
police the gendered behaviors of their victims. Unfortunately, the 
predatory gay exception often obscures the issue by limiting same-sex 
harassment inquiries to the simple question of whether or not defendants 
were lust-driven, gay harassers.182  
But these are not the only gay figures that appear in Title VII 
jurisprudence. In recent years, courts have validated claims brought by 
plaintiffs who can prove that they exhibited stereotypically homosexual 
mannerisms at work. In sharp contrast to the dangerous harasser of the 
predatory gay exception, this new gay figure appears delicate, frivolous, 
and yet equally reductive in its presentation of sexuality.  
B.  Effeminate Victim Exception 
For years, scholars and advocates have tried to shift Title VII’s focus 
from gay harassers to gay victims of harassment. The most direct method 
for achieving this end requires amending Title VII to prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination.183 But given that various legislative proposals 
                                                                                                                     
 180. Franke, What’s Wrong, supra note 124, at 769 (discussing the risks of policing 
sexualized microcultures at work). 
 181. See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Protecting the Margins: Intersectional Strategies to 
Protecting Gender Outlaws from Workplace Harassment, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 
349 (2013) (noting a judicial failure to properly apply Title VII to sexualized bullying at work). 
 182. See Coombs, supra note 138, at 126 (discussing the willingness of courts to infer the 
desire of gay defendants); see also Todd Brower, Social Cognition “At Work”: Schema Theory 
and Lesbian and Gay Identity in Title VII, 18 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 14 (2009) (examining the trope 
of the “predatory, lustful, or purely sexual nature[d] homosexual liaison[]”). 
 183. See Trevor G. Gates, Why Employment Discrimination Matters: Well-Being and the 
Queer Employee, 16 J. WORKPLACE RTS. 107, 108 (2011) (discussing attempts to adopt federal 
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to achieve this end have languished in Congress for decades, scholars 
have explained why a judicial solution exists as well.184 Pointing to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, which prohibited 
employers from discriminating against masculine women, they argue that 
the law should protect effeminate men as well.185 Professor Joel 
Friedman, for example, has asserted that a principled reading of Price 
Waterhouse ought to extend anti-stereotyping protections to effeminate 
men.186 Likewise, Professor Mary Anne Case has famously advocated for 
protecting “Hopkins in drag.”187  
Despite the scholarly support for these reverse-Price Waterhouse 
arguments, courts initially did not embrace such claims. Even though 
masculine women could sue when their employers made workplace 
decisions based on sex stereotypes, some courts did not extend the same 
protections to effeminate men.188 The fear among judges was that these 
plaintiffs were cleverly “bootstrapping” sexual orientation claims into 
stereotyping claims.189 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
described the problem this way: 
When utilized by an avowedly homosexual 
plaintiff, . . . gender stereotyping claims can easily present 
problems for an adjudicator . . . . [S]tereotypical notions 
about how men and women should behave will often 
necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and 
                                                                                                                     
protections for gay workers at the federal level); see also infra Subsection III.A.2 and 
accompanying discussion of attempts to amend Title VII. 
 184. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L. J. 1, 33 
(1995) [hereinafter Case, Disaggregating Gender]; Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity 
and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 
226–27 (2007); see also Elias Vitulli, A Defining Moment in Civil Rights History? The 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, Trans-Inclusion, and Homonormativity, 7 SEX. RES. SOC. 
POL’Y 155, 156 (2010) (discussing legislative attempts to extend federal antidiscrimination 
protections to sexual minorities). 
 185. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion). See 
generally Stephen J. Nathans, Twelve Years After Price Waterhouse and Still No Success for 
“Hopkins in Drag”: The Lack of Protection for the Male Victim of Gender Stereotyping Under 
Title VII, 46 VILL. L. REV. 713, 713–14 (2001) (discussing developments of the theory).  
 186. Friedman, supra note 184, at 227 (arguing for an expanded reading of Price 
Waterhouse). 
 187. Case, Disaggregating Gender, supra note 184, at 33. 
 188. Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403, 412 (6th Cir. 1992) (barring effeminacy discrimination 
claim); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); see also Brower, 
supra note 182, at 11–12 (discussing the difficulty that some judges have with applying rules 
related to same-sex harassment). 
 189. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
“all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual 
practices”). 
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homosexuality . . . . [W]e have therefore recognized that a 
gender stereotyping claim should not be used to bootstrap 
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.190  
To this day, some courts still fear that “avowed homosexuals” 
dishonestly attempt to squeeze sexual orientation protections out of Title 
VII. This concern causes these courts to parse through the judicial record 
to distinguish between discrimination based on homosexuality (not 
covered by Title VII) and workplace mistreatment based on effeminacy 
(arguably covered by Price Waterhouse). Take the case of Kay v. 
Independence Blue Cross.191 While working as an insurance analyst for 
Blue Cross, Harry Kay heard statements from coworkers that referenced 
both his effeminacy and homosexuality. A coworker told Kay that he was 
not a “real man,” another called him “miss prissy,” and an anonymous 
caller left a message describing Kay as “fem.”192 Contrasting these 
effeminacy remarks with explicit, anti-gay comments, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that Kay’s coworkers also called him 
“gay,” “faggot,” and “queer.”193 Weighing the relative effect of these 
statements, the court dismissed Kay’s claim by concluding that the 
harassment was “motivated by sexual orientation bias rather than gender 
stereotyping.”194 
Of course, when a speaker uses words such as “bitch” or “fag,” it is 
impossible to determine whether the verbal assault was directed at the 
listener’s gender or sexuality.195 In the speaker’s mind such words can 
represent anti-gay intent, anti-effeminacy intent, or both.196 Despite the 
difficulty with making this distinction, some courts have nevertheless 
charged juries with the task of separating evidence of effeminacy 
discrimination from anti-gay terminology used at work. For example, in 
Prowel v. Wise Business Forms,197 Brian Prowel asserted a sex-
stereotyping claim against his employer.198 Consciously avoiding any 
reference to sexual orientation discrimination, Prowel focused the court’s 
                                                                                                                     
 190. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 191. 142 F. App’x 48 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 192. Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, No. CIV. A. 02-3157, 2003 WL 21197289, at *1–2 
(E.D. Pa. May 16, 2003) (summarizing evidence of harassment against the plaintiff).  
 193. Kay, 142 F. App’x at 50–51. 
 194. Id. at 51. 
 195. See generally Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1065 n.5 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (arguing against “rigid[] compartmentaliz[ation]” in same-sex harassment cases). 
 196. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 593 (7th Cir. 1998) (examining how certain 
statements can present multiple biases); Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: 
Bullying and Harassment “Because of Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1221–22 (2008) (same).  
 197. 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 198. Id. at 286. 
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attention on his flamboyant speech and mannerisms. Prowel testified 
about his public persona stating: 
[H]e had a high voice and did not curse . . . filed his nails 
instead of ripping them off with a utility knife; crossed his 
legs and had a tendency to shake his foot the way a woman 
would sit . . . talked about things like art, music, interior 
design, and decor; and pushed the buttons on the [work 
machine] with pizzazz.199  
Noting the challenge of distinguishing between sexual orientation 
discrimination and effeminacy discrimination, the Third Circuit found 
sufficient facts to conclude that “Prowel was harassed because he did not 
conform to Wise’s vision of how a man should look, speak, and act.”200 
As with the predatory gay exception, few women appear in cases that 
attempt to isolate gender nonconformity from sexual orientation. But of 
those claims involving lesbians or “perceived lesbians,” the same 
precarious tension exists between evidence related to homosexuality and 
evidence related to gender-nonconformity.201 Serving as the corollary to 
the effeminate victim exception, courts in these cases hint at a “masculine 
victim” exception to the rule that Title VII does not protect lesbians from 
workplace discrimination.202 For example, in Lewis v. Heartland Inns of 
America,203 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sex-stereotyping claim of 
Brenna Lewis, who worked at a hotel in Iowa.204 According to the court, 
Lewis wore her hair short, sported men’s slacks, and had “an Ellen 
DeGeneres kind of look.”205 Although the court could have explained 
how Lewis’s employer discriminated against her based on “perceived 
homosexuality,” the Eighth Circuit did not directly mention Lewis’s 
sexual orientation. Instead, the court focused on Lewis’s physical look. 
Concluding that she had produced sufficient evidence to prove that her 
“tomboyish appearance” played a role in her employer’s actions, the 
Eighth Circuit allowed Lewis’s sex-stereotyping claim to proceed.206  
But if a female plaintiff’s sexual orientation itself becomes a known 
issue in a case, then courts may be less inclined to affirm any claim of 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 200. Id. at 292. 
 201. See Soucek, supra note 3, at 748–49 (discussing the prevalence of male defendants in 
claims alleging same-sex harassment). 
 202. See id. at 717–18 (summarizing case law on same-sex harassment involving women). 
 203. 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 204. Id. at 1035–36 (ruling in favor of the plaintiff without mentioning her sexual 
orientation). 
 205. Id. at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 206. Id. at 1041–43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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gender nonconformity. For example, in Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble,207 
the Second Circuit declined to credit the sex-stereotyping claim made by 
Dawn Dawson, who described herself as a “lesbian female, who does not 
conform to gender norms in that she does not meet stereotyped 
expectations of femininity.”208 Declining to assert any charge of anti-gay 
bias, Dawson stated that she suffered discrimination because of her “lack 
of feminine jewelry, lack of feminine perfume, and lack of makeup.”209 
Reviewing Dawson’s claim, the Second Circuit described “confusion as 
to the sources of the discriminatory animus allegedly visited upon 
Dawson,” and noted that Title VII did not protect Dawson “to the extent 
that she is alleging discrimination based upon her lesbianism.”210 After 
separating any allegation of sexual orientation discrimination from the 
record, the Second Circuit found insufficient evidence to justify 
Dawson’s sex-stereotyping claim.211.  
Despite the formal distinction between sex stereotyping and sexual 
orientation discrimination, courts often conflate the two concepts. This 
process is most obvious in the bootstrapping cases in which judges 
dismiss claims even when plaintiffs carefully state their cases in gender-
stereotyping terms only. By confounding these separate approaches, 
courts embrace the widely held cultural assumption that lesbians and gay 
men exhibit opposite-sex mannerisms.212 In claims involving gay men, 
for example, effeminacy becomes a marker for homosexuality through 
the following logical leaps: Because effeminate men find other men 
sexually attractive, evidence that coworkers harassed a plaintiff due to his 
high-pitched voice and feminine dress means that the discrimination 
occurred because of the plaintiff’s perceived homosexuality—a status 
that Title VII does not protect.213 This order of assumptions encourages 
employers to recast sex discrimination claims in terms of sexual 
orientation discrimination. For example, if employees utter ambiguous 
slurs such as “bitch” or “fag” at a male coworker, defendants can claim 
that the terms referenced the victim’s perceived homosexuality instead of 
                                                                                                                     
 207. 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 208. Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 209. Id. at 221. 
 210. Id. at 217–18. 
 211. Id. at 222–23 (distinguishing Dawson’s case from successful sex-stereotyping claims). 
 212. Fajer, supra note 29, at 608–09 (discussing stereotypical assumptions about 
homosexuality). 
 213. See Friedman, supra note 184, at 218; Colleen M. Keating, Extending Title VII 
Protection to Non-Gender-Conforming Men, 2 MODERN AM. 82, 82 (2008) (examining instances 
of conflation in bootstrapping cases); Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1708 (discussing the difficulty 
courts have with differentiating between the concepts of sex, gender, and sexual orientation). 
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his gender nonconformity.214 In this way, Title VII actually encourages 
employers to embrace anti-gay bias as a viable defense to harassment 
claims.215  
Even when courts “get it right” by separating effeminacy from 
sexuality, a separate set of problems arises. Just as courts that conflate the 
concepts create an incentive for defendants to characterize discrimination 
as “anti-gay,” decisions that isolate effeminacy give plaintiffs an 
incentive to accentuate certain characteristics that society views as gender 
nonconforming. Reflecting this reality, some advocates advise gay 
employees to play up their effeminacy (for gay men) or masculine look 
(for lesbians), while burying their homosexuality.216 For example, the 
General Counsel of the Human Rights Campaign issued the following 
recommendation: “No other piece of advice can be stressed more heavily 
for gay plaintiffs bringing claims under Title VII than to emphasize the 
sex stereotyping theory as much as possible and de-emphasize any 
connection that the discrimination has to homosexuality.”217 Thus, men 
must plead that their employers discriminated against them because of 
their “pizzazz” rather than their homosexuality.218 Likewise, women 
must plead that they suffered workplace harm because of their “Ellen 
DeGeneres look” rather than because of their sexual orientation.219  
Unfortunately, the gender packages that plaintiffs must embrace to 
characterize their claims in these terms may not accurately reflect their 
actual behaviors or lived experiences.220 What emerges in too many 
cases, unfortunately, is a caricatured image of the plaintiff.221 Ironically, 
then, courts that try to include a larger group of gender nonconformists 
under Title VII may unintentionally reinforce the very gender stereotypes 
                                                                                                                     
 214. See Valdes, supra note 22, at 147–48 (examining the conflation of sexual orientation 
and effeminacy). 
 215. Id. at 146–48 (discussing the consequences of conflation). 
 216. Justin M. Swartz et al., Nine Tips for Representing LGBT Employees in Discrimination 
Cases, 759 PRACTICING L. INST.: LITIG. 95, 103 (2007) (advising gay plaintiffs on litigation 
tactics); Kristin M. Bovalino, Note, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His Odds of Winning 
Title VII Litigation, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117, 1134 (2003) (same). 
 217. Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, En/Gendering Equality: Seeking Relief Under 
Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 7 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 67, 122 (2000) (explaining the dangers of revealing a plaintiff’s sexuality during 
Title VII litigation). 
 218. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 219. See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1035–36 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
 220. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 795–97 (2013) (explaining how certain plaintiffs emphasize their gender 
nonconformity). 
 221. Fajer, supra note 29, at 514–15 (arguing that these exaggerated acts have no causal 
relationship to sexual orientation).  
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that they are trying to combat.222 
In addition to creating perverse incentives for both plaintiffs and 
defendants, the effeminate victim exception overlooks entire classes of 
gender nonconformists who Title VII ought to protect. For example, 
employers frequently discriminate against men who care for children or 
those who engage in “female” occupations like nursing.223 These men do 
not necessarily exhibit feminine mannerisms, but they still buck gender 
norms in other important ways. Yet by characterizing effeminacy as the 
hallmark of male gender nonconformity, the effeminate victim exception 
highlights only one version of gender nonconformity while not 
necessarily crediting others. In the process, the claims of gender 
nonconformists other than effeminate men appear less obvious or, 
perhaps, less in need of judicial protection. 
The effeminate victim exception neglects large segments of the gay 
community as well. Of course, not all gay men are effeminate and not all 
lesbians are masculine.224 Likewise, many heterosexual men exhibit 
effeminate mannerisms and many straight women suffer workplace 
mistreatment due to their perceived “macho” persona.225 But any judicial 
approach that treats effeminacy and homosexuality interchangeably risks 
under-protecting workers who fall outside either side of the equation.226 
For example, if an open lesbian appears “feminine” at work by wearing 
long hair and makeup, courts may automatically view her workplace 
mistreatment (e.g., her male coworkers call her a “bitch”) as simply 
involving unprotected orientation-based harassment, even though the 
same mistreatment against a straight woman would give rise to a Title 
VII claim.227 Conversely, if a straight effeminate man sues for harassment 
(e.g., his coworkers call him a “fag”), courts can dismiss the complaint 
as “perceived” homosexuality harassment even though his claim has 
nothing to do with his sexuality.  
                                                                                                                     
 222. Yuracko, supra note 220, at 761–62 (discussing the unintended consequences of 
gender-stereotyping law).  
 223. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the 
Masculine Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253, 296–97 (2013) 
(examining gender nonconformity among male caregivers); Franke, What’s Wrong, supra note 
124, at 761–62 (discussing categories of non-masculine men).  
 224. Soucek, supra note 3, at 717–18 (considering the incentives created by gender-
nonconformity rulings). 
 225. Case, Disaggregating Gender, supra note 184, at 57 (distinguishing between sexual 
orientation discrimination and effeminacy discrimination). 
 226. See Angela Clements, Sexual Orientation, Gender Nonconformity, and Trait-Based 
Discrimination: Cautionary Tales from Title VII and an Argument for Inclusion, 24 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 166, 199 (2009) (calling for courts to disaggregate the concepts of sexuality 
and gender nonconformity). 
 227. Brower, supra note 182, at 65 (discussing the double-edged sword that gender-
stereotyping claims present to gay workers).  
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The problem here lies not with the sex-stereotyping theory per se, but 
rather in a reductive approach to the theory that either conflates 
effeminacy and homosexuality or, conversely, “honors” effeminacy as a 
privileged form of gender nonconformity above all others. In both 
instances, the judicial discourse on sexuality skews in wildly different 
directions. The conflating courts focus obsessively on sexuality, while 
courts that protect effeminacy pretend to ignore sexuality altogether. 228 
This tortured jurisprudence occurs precisely because Title VII prohibits 
sex discrimination but not sexual orientation discrimination. Until a legal 
mechanism exists for addressing the subjects together, judges will 
continue to refer to sexuality only in double-speak, if they talk about it at 
all. 
C.  Predators and Happy Couples: The Common Thread 
of Gay Erasure 
The effeminate victim exception and the predatory gay exception 
offer gay workers the stark choice of either burying their sexuality or 
presenting it to courts in the most culturally reified forms imaginable. The 
roles of flamboyant man, macho woman, and predatory harasser 
comprise the total universe of possible characters that gay parties can play 
in these cases. Part sexual aggressor, part clever bootstrapper, these gay 
figures barely resemble the honorable characters that appear in other 
battles for gay civil rights.229  
Yet those other legal realms contain their own reductive images of 
homosexuality. In the now-successful marriage cases, for example, gay 
parties appeared not as predators, but as ordinary neighbors—not 
frivolous and splashy, but hardworking and normal.230 As such, in 
building the case for same-sex marriage, gay plaintiffs faced another 
difficult discursive choice: to win in court they downplayed any reference 
to their sexuality. Indeed, all three settings—gay marriage, gay 
harassment, and gay victims of harassment—involve different forms of 
identity-based erasure. Title VII parties deny their sexuality, while gay 
couples pretended that their sexuality did not exist.  
There must be a better way to advance the cause of gay civil rights 
without simultaneously emphasizing distorted images of homosexuality 
along the way. In contrast to the current approach, a different legal frame 
could diversify the concept of sexuality rather than essentialize it. That 
new frame would not bury sexual orientation discrimination but instead 
                                                                                                                     
 228. See Soucek, supra note 3, at 781 (discussing the erasure of gay sexuality in Title VII 
jurisprudence).  
 229. Id. at 781–82 (examining how courts protect those gay plaintiffs who possess a certain 
look and manner). 
 230. See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying discussion of narrative trends in same-sex 
marriage litigation.  
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explain how anti-gay bias feeds into larger systems of gender production. 
In addition, it would serve as an effective legal mechanism for attaining 
gay civil rights in a wide variety of legal contexts. Most important, a new 
frame would not require gay men and lesbians to ignore their sexuality as 
a requirement for winning in court. 
III.  REFOCUSING ON SEX DISCRIMINATION: THE GENDER 
STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY 
Discrimination against sexual minorities is simply sex discrimination. 
For example, if an employer fires a man for displaying his boyfriend’s 
picture at his workstation, the employer punishes the man because he is 
male. But for the employee’s sex, the discrimination would not have 
occurred. Admittedly, this statement might initially seem to badly 
misstate the motivation for the discriminatory act. After all, the adverse 
action against the gay employee seems to have more to do with his 
sexuality than with his sex. Likewise, if the state denies a marriage license 
to a female applicant because she wants to marry another woman, then 
the state appears to discriminate against the applicant because she is a 
lesbian, not because she is a woman per se.231 Indeed, plenty of women 
receive marriage licenses as long as they choose opposite-sex spouses.  
But add comparator evidence—the gold standard in 
antidiscrimination law232—to the analysis and the presence of sex 
discrimination suddenly becomes obvious. For example, if the lesbian 
who applied for a marriage license were male, then the state would have 
approved her application without any problem. In other words, the state 
allowed men to marry brides, but denied the identical right to women. 
The same formal distinction applies to our male employee who lost his 
job for displaying a picture of his boyfriend.233 If he had been a woman, 
then presumably his employer would not have punished him for showing 
off the picture.  
Despite the elegance of the sex discrimination argument, courts have 
largely rejected it in both marriage and employment cases.234 But the 
                                                                                                                     
 231. See Case, Have to Lose, supra note 26, at 1218–19 (addressing objections to the sex 
discrimination argument). 
 232. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 732–33 
(2011) (analyzing the presence of comparator evidence in Title VII litigation). 
 233. See Koppelman, Sex Discrimination, supra note 22, at 208 (summarizing the formal 
component of the sex discrimination argument); see also Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination 
Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 397, 401–02 (2001) [hereinafter Hunter, Sex 
Discrimination] (same).  
 234. Keith J. Hilzendeger, Walking Title VII’s Tightrope: Advice for Gay and Lesbian Title 
VII Plaintiffs, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 705, 725 (2004) (discussing the sex discrimination 
argument’s failure in the employment context); Widiss et al., supra note 23, at 472–73 
(summarizing the theory’s lack of success in marriage cases).  
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theory is making a small comeback.235 This Part outlines these 
developments, while seeking to breathe new life into the sex 
discrimination argument. In addition, this Part highlights the theory’s 
most noteworthy attribute: its ability to advance numerous claims for gay 
rights beyond marriage while challenging the basis of anti-gay bias in the 
process. 
A.  Return of the Sex Discrimination Argument  
Gay-rights advocates have attempted to equate sexual orientation 
discrimination with sex discrimination for decades.236 Beginning in the 
1970s, thinkers of different ideological stripes—from those favoring 
same-sex marriage to those opposing passage of the Equal Rights 
Amendment—explained how discrimination against sexual minorities 
constituted a form of sex discrimination.237 Even though legal victories 
were hard to come by during the early years, scholars continued to defend 
the theory.238 For example, Professor Andrew Koppelman outlined the 
doctrinal and theoretical benefits of the sex discrimination argument.239 
Likewise, Professors Sylvia Law and Francisco Valdes asserted that 
marriage restrictions had less to do with regulating sexual behavior and 
more to do with enforcing gender norms.240 
At its core, the sex discrimination argument involves a frontal assault 
on classifications involving sexual orientation.241 Koppelman described 
the direct attack as follows: “[I]f the same conduct is prohibited . . . when 
engaged in by a person of one sex, while it is tolerated when engaged in 
by a person of the other sex, then the party imposing the prohibition . . . is 
                                                                                                                     
 235. See infra Section III.A and accompanying discussion of the theory’s recent success. 
 236. Hunter, Sex Discrimination, supra note 233, at 397 (discussing the judicial reluctance 
to accept the theory). 
 237. Stein, supra note 26, at 473–74 (discussing the historical development of the sex 
discrimination argument); see also Appleton, supra note 26, at 103–04. 
 238. Appleton, supra note 26, at 104–05; see also Hunter, Sex Discrimination, supra note 
233, at 397 (examining the theory’s early history); cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal 
Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the California Law Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 
411 (2012) (explaining the evolution of the sex discrimination argument). 
 239. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 154–58 
(1996); Koppelman, Sex Discrimination, supra note 22, at 199; Andrew Koppelman, Note, The 
Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Laws as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 146 (1988). 
 240. See Law, supra note 22, at 196; Valdes, supra note 22, at 16 (examining the “triangle” 
of gender, sex, and sexuality and concluding that “discrimination deemed based on sexual 
orientation also and necessarily is based on sex or on gender”). 
 241. See Widiss et al., supra note 23, at 463 (calling for courts to reconnect the facial attack 
to the gender-stereotyping attack). 
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discriminating on the basis of sex.”242  
The formal attack applies to both marriage restrictions and workplace 
discrimination.243 Consider the typical text of state same-sex marriage 
bans: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized.”244 By definition, these statutes require a determination of 
the sex of the parties involved. Without sex, the restrictions have no 
meaning. In fact, these bans do not technically classify individuals based 
on their sexual orientation. States never require marriage applicants to 
disclose their sexuality. Prior to Obergefell, gay men and lesbians could 
still marry other people as long as they married members of the opposite 
sex. The state’s ability to discriminate depends entirely on determining 
the applicant’s sex and that of his or her partner.245  
The formal critique applies in the employment context as well. An 
employer who punishes Mary for dating Jane but has no problem with 
Manuel dating Jane has quite obviously discriminated against Mary 
because of her sex (in addition to her sexual orientation).246 As a formal 
matter, the argument that orientation-based discrimination occurs 
because of sex could not be stronger.247 
But the sex discrimination argument extends beyond mere formalism. 
By drawing attention to the gender stereotypes associated with sexual 
orientation discrimination, the theory also highlights the harm created by 
these distinctions. Offered in the marriage context, the anti-stereotyping 
aspect of the sex discrimination theory posits that when states define 
marriage in opposite-sex terms, they perpetuate a patriarchal family 
system that expects women to “act like wives” and men to “act like 
husbands.”248 Indeed, prior to Obergefell, proponents of opposite-sex 
marriage had espoused these very stereotypes when they defended same-
sex marriage bans in court.249 They asserted, for example, that men have 
                                                                                                                     
 242. Koppelman, Sex Discrimination, supra note 22, at 208; see also Patrick S. Shin, 
Discrimination Under a Description, 47 GA. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (2012) (presenting the sex 
discrimination argument). 
 243. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 26, at 485–88 (outlining the contours of the direct attack). 
 244. CAL. CONST. art. I § 7.5 (2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article 
_1, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 245. Andrew Koppelman, Response: Sexual Disorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1087 
(2012) [hereinafter Koppelman, Sexual Disorientation] (discussing the facial classifications of 
state marriage restrictions). 
 246. Id. (considering a similar example). 
 247. See Case, Have to Lose, supra note 26, at 1227 (outlining possible outcomes of the sex 
discrimination argument). 
 248. Widiss et al., supra note 23, at 469 (examining the gender stereotypes of marriage 
restrictions). 
 249. See Kim, supra note 92, at 72–73 (discussing arguments in favor of opposite-sex 
marriage). 
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innate “masculine” characteristics as husbands, and that women have 
unique “feminine” characteristics as wives as well.250  
In the employment context, the anti-stereotyping prong of the theory 
takes an even wider view by challenging the universal gender stereotype 
that requires all individuals to desire members of the opposite sex.251 If a 
business fires a woman for bringing her wife to work, for example, the 
adverse action occurs because of her failure to conform to the gender 
stereotype that women desire men. Because the Supreme Court 
disapproves of classifications that rely on “fixed notions concerning the 
roles and abilities of males and females,” the anti-stereotyping prong 
explains how discrimination based on a person’s failure to exhibit 
heterosexual preferences constitutes a “fixed notion” of gender that 
employers should not regulate.252 
Until recently, courts have not found either version of the sex 
discrimination theory—the formal argument or the anti-stereotyping 
argument—particularly compelling. But after decades of languishing in 
the courtroom, several developments in marriage and employment cases 
have given the theory renewed momentum.  
1.  Obergefell, Marriage Inequality, and Sex Discrimination  
Courts that rejected the sex discrimination argument in same-sex 
marriage litigation typically did so by finding that marriage restrictions 
imposed the same burden on men and women.253 These courts reasoned 
that because a same-sex marriage ban harmed men and women equally, 
the restriction could not possibly involve sex discrimination.254 The 
continued strength of the defense is quite remarkable given its logical and 
doctrinal flaws. In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the 
equal application argument in other contexts. For example, the Court has 
repeatedly held that even when states ban interracial cohabitation or 
interracial marriage—thus equally impairing the rights of minority and 
                                                                                                                     
 250. See Michael Kavey, Slighting the Sex-Discrimination Claim in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 151, 157 (2013) (explaining how the sex discrimination 
argument highlights gender stereotypes).  
 251. Kramer, supra note 27, at 230 (referring to the “ultimate gender stereotype” of opposite-
sex desire). 
 252. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982); see also Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (evaluating the claim of gender nonconformity 
under Title VII). 
 253. See Kavey, supra note 250, at 155 (summarizing criticism of the sex discrimination 
argument). 
 254. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1074 (D. Idaho 2014), aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 
(9th Cir. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (D. Or. 2014); Bishop v. United 
States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1286–87 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d, 760 F.3d 1070 
(10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014).  
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non-minority citizens—such restrictions still constitute impermissible 
race discrimination.255  
Although scholars have debated the value of comparing race 
discrimination to sex discrimination,256 the analogy is unnecessary given 
that the Supreme Court has expressed the same principle in the sex 
discrimination context as well. In J.E.B. v. Alabama,257 an equal 
protection case involving the state’s right to exclude female jurors,258 
Justice Scalia attempted but failed to embrace the equal application 
defense in his dissent: “Since [men and women] are subject to the 
peremptory challenge . . . it is hard to see how any group is denied equal 
protection.”259 But the J.E.B. plurality explicitly rejected this equal 
application argument. The plurality Justices stated that “Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion is a mystery”260 and noted that “we have emphasized 
that individual jurors themselves have a right to nondiscriminatory jury 
selection procedures.”261 In other words, the presence of complete sex 
discrimination does not imply the absence of discrimination.262 To this 
point, if a state refuses to grant a marriage license to a woman because 
she is a woman, any separate instance of sex discrimination against men 
does not negate the personalized injury suffered by the female 
applicant.263 
Despite the historical tendency of courts to cast aside the sex 
discrimination argument, several federal court decisions that preceded 
Obergefell gave the theory new energy. The sex discrimination 
argument’s small comeback began in Perry.264 Although the case was 
best known for uniting the legal “dream team” of Ted Olson and David 
Boies,265 Perry also represented the first and most prominent instance of 
a federal court adopting the sex discrimination theory in a marriage 
                                                                                                                     
 255. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 n.11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
188–91 (1964); see also Kavey, supra note 250, at 155 (responding to the equal-application 
argument).  
 256. See generally Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of Unintended Consequences, 
2007 WIS. L. REV. 239, 267–68 (discussing criticism of the analogy to antimiscegenation laws).  
 257. 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
 258. Id. at 129.  
 259. Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 260. Id. at 141 n.12 (plurality opinion).  
 261. Id. at 140–41 (emphasis added). 
 262. See Case, Have to Lose, supra note 26, at 1226 (critiquing the equal application 
defense). 
 263. See Widiss et al., supra note 23, at 471–72 (discussing litigants’ counterarguments to 
the equal application defense). 
 264. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 265. See supra Part I and accompanying discussion of the Perry litigation. 
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decision. In addition to characterizing California’s same-sex marriage 
ban as irrational,266 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated 
that the state’s restriction constituted a cognizable form of sex 
discrimination: “Perry is prohibited from marrying Stier, a woman, 
because Perry is a woman. If Perry were a man, Proposition 8 would not 
prohibit the marriage. Thus, Proposition 8 operates to restrict Perry’s 
choice of marital partner because of her sex.”267 This ruling came as a 
surprise to many court observers given that the California Supreme Court 
had specifically rejected the sex discrimination argument just two years 
prior to Perry.268  
Unfortunately, Olson and Boies dropped the sex discrimination 
argument from their merits brief to the Supreme Court.269 But even with 
this omission, both Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Anthony Kennedy 
raised the issue at oral argument in Perry. When lawyers defending 
California’s marriage restriction cited Baker v. Nelson270—a forty-year-
old Minnesota decision that summarily rejected the sex discrimination 
argument271—Justice Ginsburg said, “Baker v. Nelson was 1971. The 
Supreme Court hadn’t even decided that gender-based classifications get 
any kind of heightened scrutiny.”272 By referring to “gender-based 
classifications” in the context of same-sex marriage, Justice Ginsburg 
subtly raised the sex discrimination argument without exploring it in 
detail.273  
Justice Kennedy posed the question even more directly during the 
Perry oral argument: “Do you believe this can be treated as a gender-
based classification? . . . It’s a difficult question that I’ve been trying to 
                                                                                                                     
 266. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997, 1002. 
 267. Id. at 996. 
 268. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 439–40 (Cal. 2008), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I § 7.5 (2008), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article_1, invalidated by Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997; Kavey, 
supra note 250, at 151 (discussing the adoption of the sex discrimination argument in Perry). 
 269. Compare Brief for Respondents, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 648742 
(filed Feb. 21, 2013) (excluding the sex discrimination argument), with Brief in Opposition at 29–
30, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 2012 WL 3683450, at *13 (filed Aug. 24, 2012) 
(including the sex discrimination argument and stating that “Proposition 8 is . . . unconstitutional 
for the additional, independent reason that it impermissibly discriminates on the basis of sex”); 
see also Kavey, supra note 250, at 153 n.9 (explaining how respondents declined to pursue the 
sex discrimination argument).  
 270. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
 271. See id. at 187.  
 272. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 
6908183 (emphasis added). 
 273. See Brief of Plaintiffs–Appellees at 58–59, Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. 
Feb. 25, 2014), 2014 WL 897509, at *23 (discussing the significance of the comments made by 
Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy at oral argument in Perry), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). 
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wrestle with . . . .”274 Although no one answered Justice Kennedy’s 
question,275 a few lower court opinions took up the issue during the two 
years between Perry and the Supreme Court’s final ruling on same-sex 
marriage in Obergefell.276 For example, in Kitchen v. Herbert,277 three 
gay couples sought to overturn Utah’s same-sex marriage ban.278 Finding 
that Utah had indeed discriminated against the plaintiffs because of their 
sex, the Kitchen court rejected the state’s equal application defense.279 
Likewise, in Wolf v. Walker,280 another pre-Obergefell marriage decision, 
a federal court in Wisconsin called the sex discrimination argument 
“thought-provoking” and noted Justice Kennedy’s interest in the theory 
during the Perry oral argument.281 Although the Wolf court struck down 
Wisconsin’s marriage restriction on other grounds, it found “some 
support for a view that, like sex discrimination, sexual orientation 
discrimination should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.”282  
In contrast to Kitchen and Wolf, other judicial opinions that came 
down immediately prior to Obergefell rejected the sex discrimination 
argument altogether.283 Thus, it would be a stretch to describe any 
unimpeded line of support for the claim leading up to Obergefell. But 
given that proponents of same-sex marriage had pressed the sex 
discrimination argument for forty years, the fact that the first and only 
                                                                                                                     
 274. Transcript of Oral Argument, Perry, supra note 272, at 13; see also Sonja West, What 
Is Anthony Kennedy Thinking?, SLATE (June 12, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/06/anthony_kennedy_s_gay_marriage_views_the
_supreme_court_justice_may_see_banning.single.html (arguing that the sex discrimination 
argument constitutes a conservative compromise to the same-sex marriage debate). 
 275. Although Charles Cooper, counsel for the petitioners, responded to the question, Cooper 
ambiguously stated that while he did “not think it [was] properly viewed as a gender-based 
classification” and “[v]irtually every appellate court . . . with one exception . . . has agreed that it 
is not a gender-based classification,” he did admit that “it is gender-based in the sense that 
marriage itself is a gendered institution.” Transcript of Oral Argument, Perry, supra note 272, at 
13–14. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 
IND. L.J. 27, 27 (2014) (discussing the Perry oral argument). 
 276. E.g., Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008–09 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub nom. 
766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 
2d 1181, 1206–07 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014). 
 277. 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.  
 278. Id. at 1187. 
 279. Id. at 1206.  
 280. 986 F. Supp. 2d 982.  
 281. Id. at 1009. 
 282. Id. 
 283. E.g., Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1074 (D. Idaho 2014), aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139–40 (D. Or. 2014); Bishop v. United 
States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. 
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). 
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federal victories on the issue occurred during this time led credence to the 
hope that the theory might enjoy a major revival in Obergefell.  
Indeed, the briefing and oral argument in Obergefell raised the 
possibility that the Court might finally answer the “difficult question” that 
Justice Kennedy had been “wrestl[ing] with” since Perry.284 In sharp 
contrast to Perry’s lawyers sheepish attempt to raise (and ultimately drop) 
the sex discrimination argument, advocates in Obergefell fully embraced 
the theory.285 They argued that marriage bans constituted a form of 
prohibited sex discrimination in two ways. First, they asserted that Ohio’s 
marriage restriction constituted an “explicit gender classification[]: a 
person’s marriage will be recognized only if her sex and her spouse’s sex 
are different. Like any other sex classification, the marriage recognition 
bans must be tested through the framework of heightened scrutiny.”286 In 
addition to arguing that Ohio’s law constituted a facial sex classification, 
the challengers also asserted that marriage restrictions relied upon 
impermissible sex stereotypes about the “proper parenting roles for men 
and women.”287 Because defenders of Ohio’s marriage restriction drew 
upon old notions about the unique roles that mothers and fathers played 
in children’s lives, challengers argued that the Court should strike down 
these bans for their reliance on gender stereotyping as well.288  
More fuel was added to the fire of the sex discrimination theory when 
Chief Justice John Roberts raised the issue at oral argument in Obergefell: 
“I mean, if Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom 
can’t. And the difference is based upon their different sex. Why isn’t that 
a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?”289 By posing the 
question in this fashion, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the sex 
discrimination argument could serve as a vehicle for the Court to rule in 
favor of marriage equality while avoiding thornier questions about the 
constitutional rights of sexual minorities: “I’m not sure it’s necessary to 
get into sexual orientation to resolve the case.”290 Reacting to this line of 
questioning, some observers noted that the sex discrimination argument 
might allow Chief Justice Roberts to avoid falling “on the wrong side of 
                                                                                                                     
 284. Transcript of Oral Argument, Perry, supra note 272, at 13. 
 285. Brief of Plaintiffs–Appellees at 35–37, Obergefell v. Himes, No. 14-3057, 2014 WL 
1745560 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2014), cert. granted, sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 
(Jan. 16, 2015), rev’d No. 14-556, slip op. at 28 (U.S. June 26, 2015).  
 286. Id. at 35–36 (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam)). 
 287. Id. at 37. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61–62, Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (Apr. 28, 
2015), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-
556q1_7l48.pdf. 
 290. See id. 
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history” by opposing marriage equality altogether.291  
Ultimately, the Obergefell Court ignored the sex discrimination 
argument in its final written opinion, instead ruling in favor of same-sex 
marriage on liberty and equality grounds.292 Noting prior authority that 
had already characterized marriage as a fundamental right, the Obergefell 
majority held that the Fourteenth Amendment empowers same-sex 
couples to exercise that fundamental right as well.293 The Court observed 
that marriage sits “at the center of so many facets of the legal and social 
order” and held that states could not selectively exclude lesbians and gay 
men from “aspir[ing] to the transcendent purposes of marriage.”294 
Describing a constitutional “synergy” between the concepts of liberty and 
equality implicated by marriage, the Obergefell majority held that the 
challenged laws improperly burdened same-sex couples’ liberty interests 
and simultaneously abridged “central precepts of equality.”295 
Despite the real-world significance of Obergefell’s invalidation of 
state marriage restrictions, the decision was also notable for what it did 
not say. In addition to overlooking the sex discrimination argument, the 
opinion also declined to identify sexual minorities as members of a quasi-
suspect class who enjoyed heightened constitutional protection from 
state-based discriminatory acts.296 By failing to articulate any clear level 
of scrutiny that applied to state discrimination against lesbians and gay 
men, the Court’s doctrinal fuzziness may have reflected a broader 
                                                                                                                     
 291. Adam Liptak, Gender Bias Issue Could Tip Chief Justice Roberts into Ruling for Gay 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/us/gender-bias-
could-tip-chief-justice-roberts-into-ruling-for-gay-marriage.html.  
 292. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 28 (U.S. June 26, 2015). Although the 
Obergefell majority cited certain historical instances of sex discrimination in marriage, Justice 
Kennedy never specifically characterized same-sex marriage bans as examples of “sex-based 
inequality.” Id. at 20–21; see also Andrew Koppelman, The Supreme Court Made the Right Call 
on Marriage Equality—But They Did it the Wrong Way, SALON (June 29, 2015, 11:15 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2015/06/29/the_supreme_court_made_the_right_call_on_marriage_equal
ity_%E2%80%94_but_they_did_it_the_wrong_way/ [hereinafter Koppelman, Right Call—
Wrong Way] (noting the absence of any reference to the sex discrimination argument in 
Obergefell). 
 293. Obergefell, slip op. at 28. 
 294. Id. at 17. 
 295. Id. at 20–22. 
 296. See generally Conkle, supra note 275, at 29 (describing various routes to legalizing 
same-sex marriage); cf. Marc A. Fajer, Toward Respectful Representation: Some Thoughts on 
Selling Same-Sex Marriage, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 599, 605 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED 
COMMITMENT (1996)) (same).  
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reticence to apply the modern tiered framework of review to gay civil 
rights in general.297  
As a practical matter, then, Obergefell announced a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage, without clearly saying much more.298 Given 
Obergefell’s specific focus on marriage, lower courts will undoubtedly 
struggle to apply the holding to future cases involving state 
discrimination against sexual minorities in areas ranging from education 
to housing to employment.299 Likewise, Obergefell effectively legalized 
same-sex unions without addressing the many instances of private 
discrimination that lesbians and gay men still encounter in society.300 
Thus, despite its undoubted significance, Obergefell failed to articulate a 
clear legal framework for addressing instances of public and private 
discrimination against sexual minorities outside of marriage. As 
explained below, given the continued need for such a framework in the 
years to come, courts may come to view the sex discrimination argument 
as the most effective way to develop such a model in a post-Obergefell 
world. 
2.  Employment Inequality as Sex Discrimination 
Although the Supreme Court declined to embrace the sex 
discrimination argument in Obergefell, the theory remains the most 
modest (yet promising) legal approach for expanding gay rights. By 
characterizing sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex 
discrimination—a well-recognized type of constitutional injury301—the 
theory does not require courts to announce a new protected 
classification.302 Yet even with its facial appeal to doctrinal conservatism, 
the sex discrimination argument would still expand gay rights in a variety 
                                                                                                                     
 297. See Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449–50 
(2004); Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 127, 129, 146–47 (2013) (explaining how “the Justices hedged their decisions” in 
the area of gay rights). 
 298. See  Koppelman, Right Call—Wrong Way, supra note 292.  
 299. See Balkin, supra note 30 (discussing “the next stages in the struggle for equality for 
sexual orientation minorities”). 
 300. See Mark Joseph Stern, Gay Couples May Soon Have to Choose Between Getting 
Married and Not Getting Fired, SLATE (July 3, 2014, 2:05 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/07/03/gay_couples_may_soon_have_marriage_rights
_but_still_face_discrimination.html (discussing civil rights issues other than marriage that impact 
the gay community). 
 301. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). 
 302. See Koppelman, A Reply to Stein, supra note 28, at 534 (explaining the sex 
discrimination argument’s “comparative advantages”); see also Fajer, supra note 29, at 647–48 
(arguing that the sex discrimination argument avoids the line-drawing problems of other 
approaches to gay civil rights). 
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of contexts. Most fundamentally, it would expose state action based on 
sexual orientation to the same heightened scrutiny as sex-based 
distinctions.303 According to this approach, states would have to articulate 
“exceedingly persuasive justifications” to discriminate against sexual 
minorities in a host of areas.304  
The sex discrimination argument would also regulate private 
discrimination in a way that other approaches to gay civil rights would 
not. For example, even the boldest constitutional step—application of 
quasi-suspect classification to sexual minorities—would still only 
directly impact the behavior of state actors. In contrast, a favorable ruling 
on the sex discrimination argument would go much further. State and 
federal laws prohibit sex discrimination in a wide range of private 
contexts such as housing and employment, whereas the same regulations 
have no direct bearing on sexual orientation discrimination.305  
At the federal level, a constitutional ruling that construed sexual 
orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination would 
effectively extend all federal bans on sex discrimination to gay 
individuals, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,306 the Fair 
Housing Act,307 Title IX,308 the Equal Pay Act309 and, of course, Title 
VII.310 These laws differ in their procedures and methods of proof, but 
they share a common prohibition against sex-based discrimination.311 For 
                                                                                                                     
 303. See Case, Have to Lose, supra note 26, at 1218 (explaining how sex-based distinctions 
trigger heightened scrutiny); Widiss et al., supra note 23, at 485 (same). 
 304. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Kirchberg v. 
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)); see also Catherine Jean Archibald, Two Wrongs Don’t Make 
a Right: Implications of the Sex Discrimination Present in Same-Sex Marriage Exclusions for the 
Next Supreme Court Same-Sex Marriage Case, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2013) (examining 
the relationship between marriage restrictions and heightened scrutiny); Koppelman, Sexual 
Disorientation, supra note 245, at 1087 (same).  
 305. David S. Cohen, Same-Sex Marriage Bans: A Form of Sex Discrimination, SLATE (Jan. 
17, 2014, 4:35 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/ 
2014/01/same_sex_marriage_bans_courts_should_strike_them_down_as_sex_discrimination.ht
ml (explaining how protections “already written into the law” could extend to sexual minorities). 
 306. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012). 
 307. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012). 
 308. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). 
 309. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). 
 310. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (listing unlawful employment practices); see also 
Koppelman, Sexual Disorientation, supra note 245, at 1083 (noting the connection between 
constitutional and statutory sex discrimination). 
 311. See Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615, 626 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he elements of a 
claim of intentional discrimination are essentially the same under Title VII and the 
Constitution.”); see also Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, 
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 
1380 n.76 (2009) (discussing the overlap between Title VII and constitutional intentional 
discrimination). 
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instance, although the Supreme Court has distinguished between Title 
VII and the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of disparate impact 
liability,312 both laws restrict parties from engaging in intentional 
discrimination based on certain traits, including sex.313 Therefore, the 
question of whether a public or private actor has intentionally 
discriminated against an individual because of sex remains the same 
under both laws.314 Thus, if the Supreme Court were to determine that 
sexual orientation discrimination constituted a form of sex discrimination 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the same holding would naturally 
apply to regulations that identify sex as a protected category.315 In short, 
the sex discrimination argument would combine the value of decisional 
narrowness with the benefit of practical breadth.  
Of course, there are other ways to obtain workplace and other 
protections for sexual minorities. For example, twenty-one states 
currently prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.316 In addition, President Bill Clinton took executive action to 
protect federal workers from sexual orientation discrimination in 1998,317 
and President Barack Obama recently extended that protection to 
employees of federal contractors.318 But given that state protections fail 
to cover over half of the U.S. population319 and that executive orders can 
change with political administrations, the most comprehensive method 
for attaining workplace protections for sexual minorities requires 
                                                                                                                     
 312. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see also Richard A. Primus, Equal 
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 495–502 (2003) 
(examining tensions between disparate impact law and equal protection). 
 313. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989). 
 314. See, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting the overlap 
between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause on the issue of intentional, sex-based 
discrimination); cf. David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
217, 228–31 (2005) (evaluating different approaches to sex discrimination under federal law). 
 315. See Fajer, supra note 29, at 638 (discussing the extension of the sex discrimination 
argument to Title VII). 
 316. Michael D. Homans, The Windsor Blowing: Fast-Changing Protections at Work for 
Same-Sex Marriage, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 3 (Mar. 22, 2014) (meeting paper 
presented at the American Bar Association Section of Labor and Employment Law Employment 
Rights and Responsibilities Committee), available at http://www.flastergreenberg.com/media/ 
article/432_ABA_Article-THE_WINDSOR_BLOWING-Michael_Homans.pdf (summarizing 
state-level protections). 
 317. Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998); see also Homans, supra 
note 316, at 14–15 (discussing the evolution of workplace protections based on sexual 
orientation). 
 318. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014). 
 319. See Homans, supra note 316, at 3 (noting that only forty-four percent of the U.S. 
population lives in states that protect against sexual orientation discrimination at work). 
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congressional action.320 To that end, gay-rights advocates have pursued 
this legislative route for forty years, first by supporting the Equality Act 
in 1974 and more recently by attempting to add sexual orientation 
protections to Title VII through the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA).321 But in the wake of Congress’s repeated failure to pass ENDA 
and an ever-widening religious exemption, gay-rights groups recently 
stopped supporting ENDA, and its passage seems unlikely for the 
foreseeable future.322 
Given legislative inaction on the topic, pressing the sex discrimination 
argument in the courts represents the most promising route for achieving 
workplace protections for the gay community in the near term.323 Before 
examining how the EEOC has recently advanced this very strategy, 
however, it is worth considering the wisdom of using the courts rather 
than the legislature to achieve this end. Indeed, most courts have rejected 
the sex discrimination argument in the Title VII context precisely because 
doing so seems to contradict congressional intent.324 After all, federal 
legislators probably did not have sexual orientation discrimination in 
mind when they enacted Title VII in 1964.325 The fact that Congress has 
repeatedly refused to pass ENDA seems to bolster the point that Congress 
never meant for Title VII to cover discrimination against sexual 
minorities.326  
But these objections fundamentally misconstrue the basic premise of 
the sex discrimination argument. Although it might seem to represent a 
clever end-run around Congress,327 the sex discrimination theory does not 
claim that Congress meant to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination 
                                                                                                                     
 320. See Soucek, supra note 3, at 721–22 (discussing congressional attempts to add sexual 
orientation discrimination protections to Title VII). 
 321. Vitulli, supra note 184, at 159–60 (summarizing attempts to amend federal 
antidiscrimination protections). 
 322. Mark Joseph Stern, Obama Signs Historic LGBT Non-Discrimination Order, SLATE 
(July 21, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/07/21/obama_signs_ 
history_executive_enda_forbidding_lgbt_discrimination.html (describing declining support for 
ENDA among gay-rights groups). See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751, 2773–74 (2014) (discussing Title VII’s exemption for certain religious entities). 
 323. See Soucek, supra note 3, at 727–28 (comparing different strategies for developing legal 
protections for gay workers).  
 324. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (scrutinizing 
the legislative history of Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition). 
 325. See DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding 
that Congress meant to cover only “traditional notions of ‘sex’” when it enacted Title VII), 
abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001); Barber, 
supra note 134, at 521. 
 326. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085–86 (examining legislative attempts to amend Title VII).  
 327. See Hunter, Sex Discrimination, supra note 233, at 409 (discussing skepticism of the 
theory). 
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in American workplaces. Rather, the theory asserts that discrimination 
against sexual minorities constitutes both sex discrimination and sexual 
orientation discrimination, and that Congress obviously intended to 
prohibit the former type of discrimination. Sex discrimination occurs (in 
addition to sexual orientation discrimination) when employers engage in 
gender stereotyping by punishing employees who do not conform to the 
gender norm of opposite-sex desire. The presence of one type of bias that 
Title VII does not cover (sexual orientation discrimination) does not 
preclude the coexistence of another type of bias that Title VII prohibits 
(sex discrimination). Employers can punish workers both because they 
are gay and because they fail to adhere to prewritten gendered scripts. 
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Oncale, even though 
Congress did not originally envision male-on-male sexual harassment 
when it enacted Title VII, courts must give Title VII its full effect by 
attacking “reasonably comparable evils” as well.328 Because Congress 
quite clearly intended to prohibit employers from discriminating against 
workers based on their sex, any doctrinal approach that limits protections 
to “traditional notions of sex”329 (e.g., covering only masculine, 
heterosexual men and feminine, heterosexual women) works contrary to 
Congress’s purpose by perpetuating rigid gender stereotypes that limit 
each sex’s freedom.330 This is why the Court in Price Waterhouse 
extended Title VII protections not only to feminine women but also to 
masculine women who suffer workplace discrimination due to their 
opposite-sex characteristics. To protect the former group but not the latter 
would ultimately turn Title VII into a mechanism for policing gendered 
behavior at work. The sex discrimination argument extends this principle. 
If the law of gender stereotyping comes with an asterisk—that Title VII 
protects gender nonconformity except when workers engage in the 
ultimate act of gender nonconformity—then the goal of combating all 
“reasonably comparable evils” of sex discrimination is lost.331 
Reflecting the belief that the theory comports with legislative intent, 
recent employment law rulings have exhibited growing support for the 
sex discrimination argument. In these cases, plaintiffs have successfully 
brought Title VII claims by arguing that their employers discriminated 
against them not because they exhibited certain mannerisms at work but 
because they violated the most basic gender stereotype in society: that 
                                                                                                                     
 328. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998); see also 
Keating, supra note 213, at 88 (outlining different views of Title VII’s legislative purpose).  
 329. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), overruling recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–
02 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 330. Capers, supra note 27, at 1185 (arguing that the sex discrimination theory comports 
with congressional intent). 
 331. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80. 
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men desire women and women desire men.332 Although this 
extraordinary shift has not garnered a great deal of public attention, the 
EEOC’s current stance differs dramatically from the agency’s previous 
guidance that harassing a gay employee is not sexual harassment because 
“it is based on the employee’s sexual preference, not on his gender.”333 
But more recent opinions make it clear that the agency now takes a far 
more favorable view of the sex discrimination argument. 
Consider the case of Veretto v. Donahoe, in which the EEOC reviewed 
Jason Veretto’s same-sex harassment allegations.334 Veretto claimed that 
after a fellow postal worker read about his forthcoming wedding to his 
male partner in the newspaper, the worker cornered Veretto, poked him 
in the chest, and stated, “I will beat you, you fucking queer.”335 
Characterizing Veretto’s claim in terms of sex discrimination, the agency 
stated that Title VII prohibits harassment based on “stereotypical gender 
roles in marriage,” including the stereotype that “marrying a woman is an 
essential part of being a man.”336  
The EEOC similarly embraced the sex discrimination argument in 
Castello v. Donahoe.337 There, Cecile Castello, a lesbian postal worker, 
alleged that her manager said, “Cece . . . gets more pussy than the men in 
the building.”338 Citing Price Waterhouse, the agency stated, 
“Complainant has essentially argued that [her manager] was motivated 
by the sexual stereotype that having relationships with men is an essential 
part of being a woman, and made a negative comment based on 
Complainant’s failure to adhere to this stereotype.”339 Because Title VII 
prohibits discrimination based on such “stereotypical gender roles in 
relationships,” the agency determined that Castello had asserted a valid 
federal claim.340 
Mirroring the EEOC’s newfound support for the sex discrimination 
argument, a federal district court in Washington, D.C., recently affirmed 
                                                                                                                     
 332. See, e.g., Castello v. Donahoe, EEOC Doc. No. 0520110649, 2011 WL 6960810, at *3 
(2011); Veretto v. Donahoe, EEOC Doc. No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *3 (2011). 
 333. 2 EEOC Compl. Man (BNA) § 615.2(b)(3) ex. 2 (1988); see also Barber, supra note 
134, at 522 (summarizing the EEOC’s previous position on claims involving sexual orientation 
discrimination). 
 334. Veretto, EEOC Doc. No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *3 (allowing plaintiff to 
challenge the “sexual stereotype that marrying a woman is an essential part of being a man”). 
 335. Id. at *1. 
 336. Id. at *3.  
 337. EEOC Doc. No. 0520110649, 2011 WL 6960810, at *3 (2011) (barring employer’s use 
of the “the sexual stereotype that having relationships with men is an essential part of being a 
woman”). 
 338. Id. at *1. 
 339. Id. at *2–3. 
 340. Id. 
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a gay plaintiff’s gender nonconformity claim in Terveer v. Billington.341 
In that case, Peter Terveer alleged that after learning about his sexual 
orientation, his supervisor told Terveer that “it is a sin to be 
homosexual . . . and that [Terveer] would be going to Hell.”342 Noting 
that Terveer’s “status as a homosexual male did not conform to the 
Defendant’s gender stereotypes associated with men,” the district court 
endorsed the sex discrimination argument by holding that Title VII 
protected Terveer from this type of harassment.343 
Extending Title VII’s reach beyond gay men who prove their 
effeminacy and lesbians who prove their masculinity, plaintiffs in these 
cases never alleged that they exhibited effeminate or masculine 
mannerisms. For example, the district court in Terveer, did not discuss 
Peter Terveer’s traits or public persona, but instead focused on whether 
Terveer conformed to his supervisor’s “preconceived definition of 
male.”344 Likewise, Jason Veretto challenged the gender stereotype that 
“real” men marry only women, and Cecile Castello challenged the gender 
stereotype that “real” women desire only men. In sum, the employees in 
these cases successfully prosecuted their Title VII claims by presenting 
the sex discrimination argument in its purest form.345 For the first time 
ever, the parties in these cases had the full and complete backing of the 
federal agency that Congress charged with combating sex discrimination 
in American workplaces. By successfully challenging the gender 
stereotype of opposite-sex desire, these decisions serve as crucial 
building blocks for expanding gay civil rights in the future.346 
B.  Gay Erasure Redux? Responding to the Moral Critique 
Even though the sex discrimination argument has gained recent 
momentum, many courts remain skeptical of the theory.347 In order for 
the argument to enjoy widespread success, a principled case for the 
argument must do more than merely articulate its doctrinal soundness. 
Proponents of the theory must directly respond to the charge that the sex 
discrimination argument is, at its core, an elaborate subterfuge. Many 
judges reject the sex discrimination argument because they believe that 
                                                                                                                     
 341. 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 342. Id. at 105–06 (quoting plaintiff’s complaint). 
 343. Id. at 116. 
 344. Id. 
 345. See also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying the sex 
discrimination argument to transgender plaintiffs); Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 
0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1, *44 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012) (same). 
 346. Case, Legal Protections, supra note 27, at 1352–54 (discussing recent gains made by 
plaintiffs asserting the sex discrimination argument under Title VII).  
 347. See supra Section III.A and accompanying discussion of the judicial treatment of the 
sex discrimination argument. 
50
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/7
2015] MARRIAGE EQUALITY, WORKPLACE INEQUALITY 1149 
 
the theory distracts from the central issue of sexual orientation 
discrimination.348 According to this view, everyone knows that the real 
bias against gay workers relates to sexual orientation discrimination (not 
sex discrimination) and that the real trait targeted by state restrictions is 
homosexuality (not gender). Given that the sex discrimination argument 
fails to address these issues, critics view the theory as nothing more than 
a gimmick.349 
Adopting this line of attack, Professor Edward Stein has argued that 
the sex discrimination argument ignores the “core wrong” of anti-gay bias 
and sidesteps moral claims made by opponents of gay rights.350 Because 
it fails to take on these issues, Stein asserts that the sex discrimination 
argument effectively concedes such debates.351 Others have echoed this 
critique. For example, Professor Martha Nussbaum has questioned the 
theory’s ability to “get at the real source of the discrimination.”352 
Similarly, Professor Jack Balkin has argued that the theory improperly 
characterizes “discrimination against homosexuals [as] merely a ‘side 
effect’ of discrimination against women, and therefore somehow less 
important.”353 In essence, these detractors assert that the sex 
discrimination argument overlooks the foundation of anti-gay bias and 
the direct harm that this bias causes to sexual minorities.  
If indeed the sex discrimination argument actually misrepresented the 
reasons why American society discriminates against lesbians and gay 
men, then it would seem to feed into the already distorted picture of 
homosexuality presented in other areas of the law. As mentioned above, 
the successful campaign for same-sex marriage tended to conceal gay 
sexuality and distort the nature of sexual orientation discrimination in a 
number of ways.354 In these cases, courts too often presented a reified 
image of ordinary, gay couples who seemed to lack sexual impulses.355 
Likewise, in Title VII litigation, accused gay harassers must deny their 
sexuality to avoid liability, while gay plaintiffs must exaggerate their 
                                                                                                                     
 348. See Soucek, supra note 3, at 785 (asserting that the theory “balkanize[s] factions of 
workers”). 
 349. See Hunter, Sex Discrimination, supra note 233, at 409–10 (explaining how some 
gender theorists remain skeptical of the sex discrimination argument). 
 350. Stein, supra note 26, at 503–04. 
 351. Id. at 504. 
 352. NUSSBAUM, supra note 26, at 115; see also Shin, supra note 242, at 11–12 (summarizing 
critiques of the theory). 
 353. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2362 (1997); see also 
Koppelman, A Reply to Stein, supra note 28, at 532–33 (summarizing arguments against the sex 
discrimination argument). 
 354. See supra Parts I and II and accompanying discussion of the judicial presentations of 
gay sexuality in marriage and employment decisions. 
 355. See Adler, supra note 12, at 148 (outlining costs of the same-sex marriage campaign). 
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effeminate mannerisms and disavow their status as sexual minorities.  
Is the sex discrimination argument yet another instance where lesbians 
and gay men must disclaim their sexuality to win in court? To date, 
proponents of the sex discrimination argument have failed to articulate a 
satisfactory answer to this question. Instead, they have often made the 
critics’ point by analogizing anti-gay bias to sexism against women.356 In 
the marriage context, for example, those advancing the theory have 
argued that same-sex marriage bans cause harm because they perpetuate 
a patriarchal family system in which women must subordinate their lives 
to men.357 According to this claim, state marriage restrictions cause losses 
both to gay couples and to women by supporting a sexist view of marriage 
wherein men enjoy disproportionate power. But at a time when most 
states have enacted gender-neutral family laws and when couples 
increasingly contest the meaning of terms like “husband” and “wife,” 
courts have found the “marriage is patriarchy” argument unconvincing.358 
As to the charge of gay erasure, arguing that courts should stop states 
from engaging in discriminatory acts against sexual minorities because 
those acts harm women merely bolsters the contention that the sex 
discrimination argument conceals the underlying basis of sexual 
orientation discrimination.  
But there is a way to recast the sex discrimination argument without 
making the harms of anti-gay bias derivative of women’s struggles. 
Rather than link the losses caused by sexual orientation discrimination to 
discrimination against women (thereby reinforcing the allegation of gay 
erasure) or connect these harms only to discrimination against sexual 
minorities (thereby reinforcing the allegation of bootstrapping), the sex 
discrimination argument must address the universal losses that all 
individuals suffer from the cultural mandate of presumed 
heterosexuality.359 When states and employers stamp a heterosexual 
identity on all legal subjects (through marriage restrictions or a tortured 
application of Title VII), they perpetuate the belief that all individuals 
should live heterosexual lives and exhibit heterosexual behavior.360 
                                                                                                                     
 356. See Widiss et al., supra note 23, at 479–80 (commenting on the “rather abstract” claims 
of harm that proponents of the sex discrimination argument have made).  
 357. Id. at 469 (discussing justifications for the sex discrimination argument in the marriage 
context). 
 358. See Nosanchuk, supra note 39, at 2006–07 (examining the evolution of ideals related to 
marriage). 
 359. Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 1087–88 (2004) (discussing how anti-sodomy legislation reflects 
heterosexual norms). 
 360. See David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind?: Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist 
Myth of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 153–54 (2009) (outlining certain facets of 
heteronormativity). 
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Sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because every gay 
and straight member of society feels the weight of the social, political, 
and legal sanctions that come with defying the gender norm of opposite-
sex desire.  
This is not a matter of abstract thinking or theoretical harm. Rather, 
presumed heterosexuality affects the day-to-day actions of all 
individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation. Consider the issue of 
“coming out” at work. Gay employees must constantly engage in a cost–
benefit analysis of the risks associated with telling coworkers about their 
sexuality.361 Reflecting the difficulty of this decision, ninety percent of 
LGBT individuals state that they have revealed their sexual orientation to 
other people, but only twenty-five percent have come out to all of their 
coworkers.362 This dilemma presents gay workers with the impossible 
choice of either anxiously guarding their private lives at work or 
pretending to be straight.363 The pressure to keep up appearances in either 
situation is constant. For example, the topics of dating and social 
relationships come up at least once per week for the vast majority of 
workers.364 Yet less than half of straight workers say that they feel 
comfortable listening to LGBT coworkers talk about their dating lives.365 
It is unsurprising, then, that over one-third of LGBT people affirmatively 
lie about their personal lives at their jobs.366 This manufacturing of stories 
about love lives and imagined opposite-sex partners as a strategy of 
concealment takes an obvious social and mental toll on gay individuals 
who engage in these practices.367  
Beyond governing the behavior of sexual minorities, presumed 
heterosexuality affects the actions of straight individuals throughout their 
lives as well. Even children are not immune from its mandates. Well 
before they become sexually active, children are consciously and 
unconsciously aware of the powerful interplay between gender and 
                                                                                                                     
 361. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 1371 (highlighting the individualized nature of the 
choice to come out); cf. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 
80–81 (2006) (discussing the phenomena of gay individuals who strive to “act straight”). 
 362. GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., SEXUAL MINORITIES IN THE 2008 GENERAL SOCIAL 
SURVEY: COMING OUT AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS i (2010); see also Turk, supra note 
116, at 469 (discussing persistent biases against gay workers). 
 363. See Yoshino, supra note 35, at 813 (examining the process of presenting “a separate 
face to the outside world”). 
 364. DEENA FIDAS & LIZ COOPER, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE COST OF THE 
CLOSET AND THE REWARDS OF INCLUSION: WHY THE WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENT FOR LGBT 
PEOPLE MATTERS TO EMPLOYERS 3 (2014) (summarizing survey data showing that over eighty 
percent of the workforce talks about dating and social relationships at least once per week). 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. (discussing the importance of non-work-related conversations). 
 367. Fajer, supra note 29, at 597–99 (examining the costs of concealment to gay individuals 
and the gay community). 
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sexuality.368 Even when grade-school boys are too young to know about 
specific sexual acts, they know to use terms like “queer” and “fag” to 
refer to gender nonconforming boys.369 Later in life, adolescent boys 
prove their heterosexuality to other boys by describing how much they 
want to “get sex” from girls.370 Conversely, the label “tomboy” applies 
to preteen girls who fail to dress and groom themselves in a way that is 
assumed to attract boys.371 This social messaging makes it clear to girls 
that they must maintain their physical attractiveness for the opposite sex 
throughout their school years and beyond.372 
The structural relationship between binary gender roles and 
compulsory heterosexuality continues into adulthood.373 This adherence 
to heterosexual norms takes place through both verbal and social acts.374 
For example, women can signal their heterosexuality at work by talking 
about male coworkers whom they find attractive, distancing themselves 
from non-heterosexual people, or accusing coworkers of being gay.375 
Men also feel a strong urge to exhibit their heterosexuality both inside 
and outside the office.376 Because they know that other men target gay 
employees for harassment, men attempt to prove their heterosexuality to 
male coworkers by engaging in hypermasculine acts such as bringing 
                                                                                                                     
 368. Emma Renold, They Won’t Let Us Play . . . Unless You’re Going out with One of Them: 
Girls, Boys and Butler’s “Heterosexual Matrix” in the Primary Years, 27 BRIT. J. SOC. EDUC. 
489, 493–502 (2006) (discussing the consequences experienced by children who “actively worked 
against the heterosexual grain”). 
 369. See Varona & Monks, supra note 217, at 67–68 (examining the relationship between 
gender and sexuality). 
 370. See Deborah L. Tolman, In a Different Position: Conceptualizing Female Adolescent 
Sexuality Development Within Compulsory Heterosexuality, 2006 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT DEV. 71, 79; see also Koppelman, Sex Discrimination, supra note 22, at 235 
(explaining that adolescents learn “no later than high school that [the imputation of homosexuality 
is] one of the nastier sanctions that one [may] suffer”). 
 371. Renold, supra note 368, at 502–04.  
 372. See Varona & Monks, supra note 217, at 81 (scrutinizing the gender codes of girlhood 
and boyhood).  
 373. See Steven Seidman, Critique of Compulsory Heterosexuality, 6 SEXUALITY RES. & 
SOC. POL’Y 18, 23 (2009) (discussing the gendered nature of presumptions related to sexuality). 
 374. See Laura Hamilton, Trading on Heterosexuality: College Women’s Gender Strategies 
and Homophobia, 21 GENDER & SOC’Y 145, 147 (2007); Adrienne Cecile Rich, Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 15 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 11, 21 (2003) (outlining instances 
of heterosexual norms at work). 
 375. See JAMES JOSEPH DEAN, STRAIGHTS: HETEROSEXUALITY IN POST-CLOSETED CULTURE, 
149, 163 (2014) (discussing strategies people may employ to exhibit their heterosexuality); cf. 
MacKinnon, supra note 359, at 1087–88 (outlining the effects of dominant masculinity and 
heterosexuality on women). 
 376. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 1333–34 (discussing heterosexual men’s insecurities 
related to sexuality). 
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girlfriends to work parties, talking frequently about their sexual 
conquests, and laughing at the correct jokes.377 
These public displays leave no room for ambiguity. Even though 
many self-identified straight individuals engage in same-sex sexual 
behavior, presumed heterosexuality requires anyone who strays from the 
norm to conceal these instances of deviation.378 Just as heteronormativity 
relies upon a binary construction of gender, it also makes the possibility 
of fluid sexuality seem unimaginable.379 Although these rules are not 
necessarily “normal” or “natural,” presumed heterosexuality makes them 
seem as such.  
Laws such as Title VII and state marriage restrictions work to bolster 
those gender norms by creating powerful incentives for individuals to 
“act straight.” For example, same-sex sexual harassment law punishes 
self-identified gay harassers but dismisses as “horseplay” the sexual acts 
of self-identified “straight” harassers.380 Likewise, a same-sex marriage 
ban allows opposite-sex couples to claim hundreds of legal protections 
but denies the same privileges to gay couples.381 These rules work in 
tandem with cultural representations and social interactions to compel 
compliance with heteronormative mandates.382  
The sex discrimination argument has failed to attain widespread 
judicial acceptance because advocates have not adequately articulated the 
concrete harms that all men and women—both gay and straight—
experience from laws like Title VII and marriage restrictions that enforce 
heteronormativity. The isolated prosecution of the theory partly explains 
this difficulty.383 For example, proponents of the theory have explained 
why marriage restrictions constitute sex discrimination and, separately, 
why sexual orientation harassment at work constitutes sex 
discrimination.384 But this issue-by-issue focus cannot fully capture the 
                                                                                                                     
 377. Yoshino, supra note 35, at 813 (listing the steps that some gay men take to act 
“straight”). See generally Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 777, 793 (2000) (examining hypermasculinity). 
 378. See Coombs, supra note 138, at 126–27 & n.99 (discussing the realities of same-sex 
sexual desire among some straight individuals). 
 379. Vitulli, supra note 184, at 159 (examining social systems that reinforce 
heterosexuality). 
 380. See supra Section II.A and accompanying discussion of the predatory gay exception to 
Title VII. 
 381. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (referencing over 1000 
federal laws that address marital or spousal status); Spade, supra note 99, at 81 (discussing 
benefits enjoyed by members of the “marriage-based family structure”). 
 382. Seidman, supra note 373, at 19 (examining the social imperatives of heteronormativity). 
 383. See generally Hunter, Sex Discrimination, supra note 233, at 399–400 (summarizing 
the scholarly debate over the sex discrimination argument). 
 384. See supra Section III.A and accompanying discussion of the theory in the context of 
marriage and employment. 
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ubiquity of heterosexual norms and their influence on gay and straight 
individuals in a variety of contexts. For example, the gay plaintiff who 
employs the sex discrimination argument in a Title VII case seems to 
represent only his own interests, or at most the interests of other gay 
workers. Likewise, same-sex couples who employ the theory in the 
marriage setting seem to represent their own interests, or perhaps only 
those of the gay community. Therefore, when parties raise the theory in 
court, judges tend to view these discrete discriminatory acts as isolated 
instances of sexual orientation discrimination and not gender 
discrimination.  
Reflecting this narrow view of the theory, courts repeatedly express 
the belief that sexual orientation discrimination cannot simultaneously 
constitute gender discrimination. For example, one recent decision that 
rejected the sex discrimination argument concluded that the state 
marriage restriction at issue was not “motivated by a gender 
discriminatory purpose.”385 Likewise, another court recently found that 
“the intent of the laws banning same-sex marriage is not to suppress 
females or males as a class.”386 In other words, because marriage 
restrictions seemed to affect only the gay couples petitioning for 
marriage, courts had a hard time seeing how these laws negatively 
affected the behavior of “females or males as a class” (i.e., both gay and 
straight individuals).  
Unfortunately, such artificial distinctions between gender, sex, and 
sexual orientation remain common in law.387 Judicial pronouncements 
frequently articulate categories involving “men,” “women,” “gays,” and 
“straights,” while pretending that these categories constitute natural and 
innate divisions.388 But a renewed focus on heteronormativity can 
underscore the illogic of such parceling by showing how presumed 
heterosexuality commands specific actions and punishes attempts at 
defection among members of different groups.389 By emphasizing how 
state acts of discrimination and employment rules work together to 
regulate the behaviors of all individuals, the sex discrimination argument 
                                                                                                                     
 385. Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1074 (D. Idaho 2014), aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 386. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub nom. 766 F.3d 
648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
 387. Valdes, supra note 22, at 24 (explaining the interrelationship between these concepts). 
 388. Robinson, supra note 19, at 1331 (illustrating connections between notions of gender 
and sexual orientation); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination 
Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 97–98 (1995) (discussing 
the gendered meaning of the term “sex” within antidiscrimination law). 
 389. See generally Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 948–56 (1989) (examining the 
contradictory definitions of homosexuality in the law). 
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highlights the many actions and attitudes that individuals must exhibit to 
comply with this gendered ordering. 
Beyond highlighting shared harms, a focus on heteronormativity’s 
forceful sway creates the possibility for creating alliances between 
artificially dichotomized groups. Consider the example of an employer 
who fires a man for bringing his boyfriend to a company party.390 By 
explaining how his employer would have left him alone had he been a 
woman, the plaintiff draws attention to the gender norm requiring gay 
workers to keep their love lives private, as well as the gender norm 
requiring straight workers to advertise their heterosexuality. In this way, 
the sex discrimination argument demonstrates the personal interests that 
all workers have at stake when employers penalize exhibitions of same-
sex desire.391 The punishment of the gay employee not only regulates the 
behavior of other sexual minorities at work, it also identifies the 
performances and behaviors that employers expect of straight workers as 
well. 
The normative impulse for states to discriminate against gay 
individuals works in tandem with the normative impulse of employers to 
punish instances of homosexual expression at work. Through a 
constellation of signposts—state acts of discrimination, workplace rules, 
and many others—the gender norm of opposite-sex desire requires gay 
and straight individuals to adhere to its mandates. Regardless of whether 
states or employers impose these rules, each instance of enforcement 
serves as a reminder about proper and improper expressions of sexuality 
and gender. Viewed in this more comprehensive light, a refocused sex 
discrimination argument draws attention to the ways in which presumed 
heterosexuality shapes individual behavior and curbs personal 
expression. Situated this way, the sex discrimination argument does not 
bury the causes of anti-gay bias, but instead brings them to the fore. 
CONCLUSION 
At times it seems like the different gay figures of marriage equality 
and employment law barely resemble one another. From the non-
threatening married couples of Obergefell to the predatory harassers of 
Title VII, the roles that sexual minorities occupy in the law vary widely. 
Despite this discordant imagery, however, these cases remain united in 
their undifferentiated representations of the individuals involved. 
Although advocates commonly describe same-sex marriage as the gay 
community’s most important civil rights issue, workplace protections 
                                                                                                                     
 390. See Fajer, supra note 29, at 649–50 (utilizing a similar example to highlight societal 
preconceptions about homosexuality). 
 391. See Appleton, supra note 26, at 124–25 (examining how “gender talk” can create 
alliances between groups); Hunter, Sex Discrimination, supra note 233, at 415–16 (explaining 
how both gay and straight individuals benefit from the successful prosecution of the sex 
discrimination argument).  
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affect far more people and remain a high priority for many lesbians and 
gay men. Today, even with the legalization of same-sex marriage, federal 
law still makes it perfectly legal to fire a gay man for telling a coworker 
about his sexuality or to discharge a woman for displaying her wife’s 
picture at work. 
In the wake of Obergefell, advocates can continue pursuing gay civil 
rights without talking about sexuality, or they can finally confront the 
gender stereotype of opposite-sex desire that lies at the root of anti-gay 
bias. This more ambitious course would not only expand legal protections 
for sexual minorities beyond marriage, it would finally allow gay 
plaintiffs to prosecute their claims without having to embrace reductive 
images of sexuality along the way. 
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